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This thesis consists of three essays on the innovation strategies of latecomer firms 
from emerging economies. The main aim is twofold. The first is to study how 
these firms use the innovation strategy of the latest generation (Rothwell, 1994) – 
open innovation – for technological catching-up. The second is to further explore 
the application of open innovation in a specific type of innovation that could 
make latecomers an actual economic powerhouse – disruptive innovation 
(Christensen, 1997). The conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 0-1; the details 
are elaborated in the following paragraphs and Table 0-1. 
According to Rothwell (1994) and Chesbrough (2003), the era of open innovation 
has arrived: it is critical for firms to draw on external resources through interfirm 
cooperation to amplify the value of their own innovation assets and achieve 
greater innovation performance. However, current literature indicates that the 
actual increase of a latecomer‘s innovation performance through open innovation 
may be debatable. In order to ascertain the effectiveness of open innovation to a 
latecomer‘s innovation performance, this study examines how latecomers use the 
two extreme ends of the open innovation spectrum: licensing and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). 
Open innovation research operates through four different mechanisms, ranging 
from simple to complex, as shown in Figure 0-2. The lowest end, licensing, is the 
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most simple and the most common open innovation mechanism for latecomers to 
acquire technologies. M&A is the most complex, necessitating a full range of 
resources. 
The literature thus far has demonstrated mixed results regarding the impact of 
inward technology licensing (ITL) on a latecomer‘s innovation performance. 
Based on a sample of 154 Chinese high-tech firms, Essay One firstly investigates 
whether ITL could promote a latecomer‘s innovation performance. I then discuss 
the importance of technology newness in ITL strategy, arguing that the strategic 
choice of the right technology does provide latecomers with the opportunity to 
gain the benefits from learning by licensing.  
In the past decade, latecomers in China have attempted to swiftly catch up with 
technology trends by increasing M&A. Using a sample of 100 listed Chinese 
high-tech firms, Essay Two examines the substitution effect in M&A among 
latecomers in China. I investigate whether these latecomer acquirers substituted 
their own competency with that of the target firms in order to achieve growth 
through innovation. It was found that when an acquiring firm integrates a target 
firm with a relatively greater knowledge base from a distant technology domain, 
increased innovation could result. 
Essay Three focuses on the role of open innovation in the disruptive innovation 
setting. I argue that disruptive innovation does not necessarily lead to competition 
between latecomers and incumbents, and investigate situations where both parties 
 ix 
 
have cooperated, with beneficial results. In-depth case studies of disruptive 
innovation cases in China‘s high-tech industries were conducted to substantiate 
this point.  
This thesis attempts to fill a number of gaps in the literature. The findings would 
advance the knowledge of the strategic management literature of both open 
innovation and disruptive innovation, and contribute to the academic views of 
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Table 0-1. Summary of the three essays 
 
 Essay One  
Technology Licensing and Innovation 
Performance: Evidence from Chinese 
Latecomers in High-tech Industries 
Essay Two 
Substitution Effect in Mergers and 
Acquisitions on Innovation Performance: 
Evidence from Chinese Latecomers in 
High-tech Industries 
Essay Three 
Combining Open Innovation (OI) and Disruptive 
Innovation (DI): Evidence Based on Case Studies 




The way by which licensing-in experience 
affects innovation performance focusing 
on the impacts of number of licenses, 
technology age and absorptive capacity. 
Whether there is a substitution effect in 
M&A and when it takes place at the 
acquiring firm. 
Whether latecomers could cooperate with 
incumbents (i.e., use OI) to commercialize DI 





H1. The number of licenses has a 
curvilinear (an inverted U) effect on the 
subsequent innovation performance of a 
licensee.  
 
H2.  The age of licensed-in technology has 
a negative effect on the subsequent 
innovation performance of a licensee.  
 
H3. A licensee‘s existing technological 
capability positively moderates the 
relationship between the number of 
licenses and the subsequent innovation 
performance. 
 
H4. A licensee‘s existing technological 
capability negatively moderates the 
relationship between the age of licensed-in 
technology and the subsequent innovation 
performance. 
H1. Technology distance has a negative 
effect on the subsequent innovation 
performance of an acquiring firm. 
H2. The relative knowledge base positively 
moderates the relationship between the 
technology distance and the subsequent 
innovation performance of an acquiring 
firm. 
 
P1. In cases where latecomers have 
complementary assets and IP, DI can be achieved 
without OI. This may be because de alio 
latecomers are able to leverage complementary 
assets created in other markets. 
 
P2. In cases where latecomers lack complementary 
assets and IP in the target market, they may win 
by using OI practices in developing and 
introducing a DI into the market. However, this is 
only possible for latecomers who can subsequently 
develop their own complementary assets or IP. 
 
P3.  In cases where latecomers have IP but not the 
required complementary assets, they can 
undertake OI strategies to gain access to external 
complementary assets to commercialize DI.  
 
 
P4.  In cases where latecomers have the required 
complementary assets but without IP in the target 
market, they can source external technologies to 
achieve DI by engaging in OI. 
Data  State Intellectual Property Office of China 
(SIPO) and firm websites 
Taiwan Economic Journal, SIPO, firm 
annual reports and online reports 
interviews, firm websites, academic papers, books 
and online reports 
  xii 
 Essay One Essay Two Essay Three 
Unit of 
Analysis  
Firm Firm Firm 
Sample size 151 208 6 
Methods Negative binomial regression (firm level) Negative binomial regression with random 
effects model (firm year panel) 
Multiple case studies  
Key 
Findings 
 The newer the licensed-in technology is, 
the better the subsequent innovation 
performance is.  
 
 If technology age is not taken into 
account, the curvilinear (an inverted U) 
relationship between number of licenses 
and the subsequent innovation 
performance is obscured. 
 
 Firms with higher absorptive capacity 
have a more optimistic perception to 
adopt the larger number of licenses and 
newer technologies. 
 
 The negative relationship between 
technology distance and the subsequent 
innovation performance is evidenced 
among Chinese latecomers, rather than 
an inverted U shape based on developed 
economies. 
 
 When an acquirer integrates a target firm 
with a relatively greater knowledge base 
from a distant technology domain, this 
better supports the substitution and 
promotes innovation. 
 Whether or not to combine DI and OI would 
depend on the presence of complementary 
assets and intellectual property. 
 
 The three ways to benefit both latecomer 
disruptors and incumbents by engaging in OI 
are concluded as follows: 
(1) OI facilitates a latecomer‘s survival or the 
success of DI;  
(2) OI allows both latecomers and incumbents 
to be involved in DI;  
    (3) OI, such as out-licensing and spin-offs, 




 Looking into the characteristics of 
licensed-in technologies to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Inward Technology 
Licensing (ITL) is a possible way to 
reconcile previous conflicting empirical 
evidences. 
 
 Being the first to verify the importance 
of technology age raises the needs to 
pay more attention to the strategic 
choice of licensed-in technologies. 
 
 How much a firm can gain from ITL 
depends very much on the firm itself.  
 There is under-recognition of the 
substitution effect in the M&A literature. 
The strategic intention to undertake 
M&A (substitute or not) may be more 
important than the management 
challenges in maximizing synergies.  
 
 Highlighting the difference between 
firms from developed economies and 
latecomers from emerging economies in 
the resource integration with target firms 
may add on a more complete picture of 
the M&A literature.  
 The identification of the important role of OI in 
establishing and sustaining DI development 
changes the sole competition scenario between 
latecomer disruptors and incumbents in the DI 
literature. 
 
 Firms should learn from the benefits of 
collaboration and promotes the co-development 
of DI by latecomers and incumbents. 
 
 Firms should learn to manage its innovation 
partners based on their own conditions. 
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                                          CHAPTER1. 
                                     INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Background and Motivation 
In the last decade, emerging economies such as China, India, Russia and Brazil 
entered in the global competitive landscape, exhibiting unprecedented growth. The 
accelerating shift of global economic power has unleashed a vast number of 
opportunities to firms located in emerging economies. Firms from emerging 
economies generally enter late into the high-tech industries by necessity, not by 
their own choices, and thus are termed latecomers (Mathews, 2002). Indeed, some 
latecomers have managed to catch up with industry leaders from developed 
economies. However, though they may enjoy some initial advantages, latecomers 
face myriad challenges of technological catching-up, including poor technology 
resources, inferior pre-emption of assets, costly buyer switching costs and less 
National Innovation System (NIS) support (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; 
Cho et al., 1998; Mathews, 2002). To meet these challenges, latecomers are more 
likely to cooperate with others and become innovative in order to survive.  
Innovation is critical to a latecomer‘s survival. Any innovation strategy adopted by 
a latecomer would involve a value creation process that acknowledges the role of 
external resources in developing competitive advantages and improving the 
effectiveness of innovation. External resources, such as knowledge, assets and 
  2 
skills lie outside the boundaries of latecomers, and are usually owned by 
incumbents. Latecomers often access these external resources by cooperation with 
other firms. This kind of interfirm cooperation is conceptualized as a new 
paradigm, namely open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al., 2006), 
which allows a firm to draw on external resources to amplify the value of their 
own assets. The focal firm (latecomer in this thesis) usually has weaker resource 
accumulation than incumbents (Mathews, 2002). The asymmetric nature of this 
relationship between latecomers and incumbents has not gained much attention in 
the extant open innovation literature (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al., 2006). 
However, through the channel of open innovation, latecomers may recognize, 
assimilate and apply imported resources to create their own innovations. Once 
created, the new innovation is added to the resource pool in the open environment 
for other firms to use. For instance, incumbents may adopt a new innovation 
created by latecomers to renew their internal competency. Thus, dynamic 
cooperative interaction between latecomers and incumbents consists of bilateral 
resource flows in the value creation process, which is demonstrated in Figure 1-1.  
When latecomers utilize external resources, the differences in the innovation 
performance that they create are strongly related to strategic management based on 
their internal capabilities. However, while this relationship suggests the 
coexistence of potential benefits and additional costs when latecomers adopt open 
innovation, open innovation itself does not automatically lead to a convergence of 
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internal and external resources. Thus, an important task in innovation management 
is to optimally internalize the external resources, thereby promoting innovation. 
 
Figure 1-1. Value creation in an open source environment 
 
The internalization of the external resources, especially technology resources, is 
associated with technological process in a broad sense. The technological process 
necessitates both indigenous R&D and the effective utilization of external 
technologies. These external technologies generated by other firms are also known 
as spillover technologies (Griliches, 1979). There are many factors that affect the 
overall technological process, including self-generation factors, dependent factors 
and the indirect factors, as shown in Figure 1-2 (Watanabe and Asgari, 2004). The 
self-generation factors represent a firm‘s own efforts in technology development, 
such as the R&D investment. The dependent factors include assimilated (absorbed) 
   Incumbent 
or 
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spillover technologies, learning effects and economies of scale. In addition, the 
indirect factors, such as labor, capital, managerial improvement, institutional 
revolution and policy, also affect the technological process. In this thesis, I focus 
on the innovation that contributes to technological development by latecomers, 
which can be attributed to collaborative work of learning, spillover technologies 
together with existing technology stock generated by internal R&D.       
 
 
Figure 1-2. Composition of total factor productivity  
(Source: Watanabe and Asgari, 2004) 
 
To effectively utilize spillover technologies, latecomers should first be able to 
identify which external technology should be learnt, should not be learnt, or cannot 
be learnt. Then latecomers should import the technologies that should be learnt 
into the existing technology stock and internalize them. The success of this 
internalization is determined by the absorptive capacity of latecomers, and thus 
absorptive capacity is critical for the effective utilization of spillover technologies. 
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Absorptive capacity can be attributed to the accumulation of past learning 
experience. The learning experience results from incorporating the spillover 
technologies into the production system. Therefore, learning plays an important 
role of the effective utilization of spillover technologies. This process of 
internalizing spillover technologies is illustrated in Figure 1-3. 
 
Figure1-3. The process of internalizing spillover technologies  
(Source: Watanabe et al., 2001) 
 
Although some latecomers can successfully internalize external resources, 
especially spillover technologies, into the innovation process through open 
innovation, others are not successful. In order to reveal the strategies behind the 
success stories, this thesis aims to examine how latecomers capture value from 
open innovation in the emerging economy context.  
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In the following sections, I will review the advantages and disadvantages of being 
a latecomer, as well as the innovation strategies that latecomers use to meet these 
challenges. A brief overview of previous and on-going research on the innovation 
strategies of latecomers will also be presented. 
 
1.1.1 Disadvantages and Advantages of Latecomer Firms 
The literature on technological innovation management has shown great interest in 
how latecomers are able to catch up with industry leaders. Ever since the entry 
order effect was first mentioned and examined by Bain (1956), scholars have 
endeavoured to identify latecomer disadvantages and advantages from different 
perspectives like the resourced-based view, institutional theory and transaction cost 
economics (Hobday, 1995; Cho et al., 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Xie and Wu, 
2003; Mathews, 2006; Tzeng, 2008).  
Latecomer disadvantages have been mostly examined in four aspects: initial 
technology resources being poor, inferior pre-emption of assets, costly buyer 
switching costs and less NIS support (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Cho et 
al., 1998; Mathews, 2002). As late entrants to an industry, latecomers face many 
roadblocks (Mathews, 2002). Unlike latecomers, early movers have developed 
technology leadership derived from long-term cumulative experience and learning. 
Incumbents may establish technology barriers for latecomers by applying for IP 
protection and leveraging industry standard settings (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). 
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Also, early movers may pre-emptively obtain the limited assets, such as locations, 
product characteristics, equipment investments and distribution channels 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Latecomers‘ potential consumers may find 
the switching cost to be prohibitive, and will thus remain loyal to existing pioneer 
products. The switching cost, including investment to be a qualified innovation 
supplier, supplier-specific learning by the buyer and contractual switching cost, are 
costly for latecomers due to customers‘ loyalty to existing pioneer products 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Cho et al., 1998). Latecomers from emerging 
economies are usually isolated from the firms that own most of the high-tech 
resources, namely incumbents from developed economies. Moreover, the 
underdeveloped NIS infrastructure in emerging economies provides insufficient 
incentives and protection to domestic firms.  
However, latecomer advantages do exist and they shape these firms‘ catching-up 
strategies. One such advantage is the lower cost and risk of innovation (Mathews, 
2002) than for early movers. For example, industry readiness is usually high in 
terms of educated consumers and trained workers when latecomers enter the 
market. More importantly, latecomers are able to be free-riders by exploiting the 
technology resources of early movers in three main ways. First, knowledge 
spillover and learning-based productivity improvements make the free-rider effect 
available to latecomers (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Cho et al., 1998). 
Second, cost reduction can be achieved in the labour market by pre-employee 
screenings because early movers have already performed the verification and 
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education of the past employees (Guasch and Weiss, 1980). Third, latecomers can 
take advantage of pre-empted assets by partnering with others. This partly stems 
from the complementary ownership of assets co-specialized with the underlying 
innovation. In addition, latecomers can learn from early movers‘ mistakes, both 
technological and otherwise. The market tests by early movers may spare 
latecomers from the risk of the unknown nature of customer response to an 
innovation. 
The four basic characteristics of latecomer firms have been outlined by Mathews 
(2002) as follows: (1) Industry entry: late entrant to an industry, not by choice but 
by historical necessity; (2) Resources: initially resource poor, e.g., lacking 
technology and market access; (3) Strategic intent: focused on catching-up as its 
primary goal (Mathews and Cho, 1999); (4) Competitive position: some initial 
competitive advantages, such as low cost, which can be achieved by learning from 
proven technologies/prior experiences initiated by predecessors. Besides, 
latecomers from emerging economies have another characteristic of being close to 
emerging markets. In spite of their resource constraints, they may react to the 
latent needs in emerging markets actively due to less organizational inertia. To 
further achieve their strategic goal of catching-up, latecomers must be able to 
overcome their disadvantages and leverage their advantages. The latecomer 
challenges can be resolved by targeted strategies, which will be elaborated in the 
next section.  
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1.1.2 Innovation Strategies of Latecomer Firms  
Rothwell‘s (1994) five generations of innovation are recognized worldwide as a 
milestone in the development of an understanding of innovation strategies. In the 
early 1950s, the rise of multinational firms in the west and Japan swelled the 
economy through high-tech development. Thus, the first generation of innovation 
was mainly driven by technology breakthroughs, and R&D was regarded as a 
firm‘s ‗ivory tower‘. From the 1960s to the 1970s, the battle for market shares 
shifted the innovation focus to the second generation, namely the ‗market pull‘ 
generation. Subsequently, in the mid-1970s, the emergence of inflation and 
stagflation motivated firms to cut down on their operational costs. Hence, R&D 
and marketing became more tightly aligned, and this coupling is now referred to as 
the third generation of innovation. As the economy recovered in the early 1980s, 
the revolution of the fourth generation of innovation started from a ‗time-based 
struggle‘ where the strategic focus was on integrated business processes and 
linkages between suppliers and leading customers were strengthened. From the 
1990s onward, resource constraints became the central debate. As a critical part of 
their innovation management, firms began to look outside their boundaries for 
collaborative partnerships. This is called the fifth generation, also known as the 
era of open innovation, and is notable for its emphasis on system integration and 
networking. Chesbrough (2003) claimed that open innovation had become the new 
paradigm of external resource utilization. By doing so, a firm can move back and 
forth more flexibly via different mechanisms, as illustrated in Figure 1-4.  
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In contrast to the other four generations, the fifth generation is not clearly defined 
at an operational level. Although research has proven that open innovation is 
beneficial to incumbents, less attention has been paid to latecomers. Thus, there is 
much to investigate with regard to how open innovation may impact latecomers‘ 
growth. 
 
Figure 1-4. An open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003) 
During the last decade, due to the decentralization of manufacturing and the 
Internet, this openness and access to information has sped up resource transfers 
around the globe. Hence, many firms have experienced change at a rate well 
beyond what could have been expected. Information symmetry has enhanced the 
freedom of technology transfer and created a new stream of innovators, i.e., 
latecomers. Unlike fast followers, these firms do not use open innovation passively; 
rather, they use external resources in order to innovate.  
Furthermore, the type of innovation that a latecomer performs is selective, 
depending on its specific disadvantages and advantages. According to Tidd et al. 
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(2001) and Gatignon et al. (2002), innovations can be classified as incremental 
innovation (sustaining innovation and continuous innovation), radical innovation 
(sustaining innovation and discontinuous innovation) or disruptive innovation 
(discontinuous innovation). Next, I will examine all three types of innovation and 
explain why disruptive innovation has proven to be the most beneficial to 
latecomers.  
Incremental Innovation: Through incremental innovation, a firm makes a 
sustainable improvement to an existing product and develops a critical competitive 
strategy in an established industry. However, incremental innovation does not 
appear to be an ideal candidate for those latecomers for two reasons: first, 
latecomers might not have the existing technology to incrementally improve; 
second, it is almost impossible for latecomers to succeed when competing directly 
with incumbents in an incremental innovation market.  
Radical Innovation: Through radical innovation, a firm dramatically changes a 
product to create a high-end market with greater profits. Radical innovation is not 
suitable for latecomers, as they would not have sufficient time, financial resources 
and technological capabilities to create superior technologies.  
Disruptive Innovation: Disruptive innovation enables firms to create a new ride, 
or to attack the mainstream market from the low-end, if their products are good 
enough. Even if latecomers have limited resources, they can successfully use 
disruptive innovation. This is particularly true for such firms in emerging 
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economies, where many hidden needs may still be unmet at the bottom of the 
pyramid markets (Prahalad, 2004, 2012). To focus on the needed business model, 
latecomers likely require technological support from external partners. However, 
unlike latecomers, incumbents are usually not attracted to disruptive innovation in 
low-end or new niche markets (Christensen, 1997). Thus, incumbents feel less 
threatened and are willing to cooperate with latecomers. This cooperation allows 
incumbents to act as significant economic players in new or low-end markets.  
The aforementioned five generations, each with its own specific innovation 
strategy, offer simple representations of a complex business world. The different 
innovation strategies belonging to the distinct generations can occur concurrently 
to bring about better and faster innovations. By focusing on latecomers‘ strategic 
dimensions, this thesis investigates the significance of the innovation strategy of 
the latest generation, namely open innovation, and the disruptive innovation 
strategy that offers the most favourable innovation trajectory for technological 
catching-up. Specifically, this thesis will examine the general impact of open 
innovation on latecomers‘ growth, as well as how this strategy affects the 
development of disruptive innovation. Thus, the next two subsections will review 
the literature on the impact of open innovation on latecomers‘ growth and the 
combined utilization of open innovation and disruptive innovation. 
1.1.3 Open Innovation as a Critical Strategy for Latecomer Firms 
The foundation of  how well  latecomers  can  create  innovation  is  how  well  they 
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formulate strategies through targeted catching-up efforts. Of these various 
strategies, technology acquisition through open innovation is especially useful for 
latecomers with limited resources to break technology barriers and renew their 
internal competency. As previously discussed, entering the industry late may give 
latecomers the unexpected advantage of being able to access already-developed 
advanced technologies. Latecomers can then use the proven technologies to create 
innovation at a lower cost, and do it more quickly than the early movers who 
initially developed the technologies. To secure such an advantage, latecomers must 
complete the following two steps. First, they should identify which technologies 
are useful and then secure access to them through the channel of open innovation. 
For example, inward technology licensing (ITL) is the most basic channel of 
technology transfer and has been widely adopted by latecomers. Second, the 
latecomers should evolve from learners to innovators, relying on their absorptive 
capacity. Absorptive capacity is a firm‘s ability to recognize the value of 
technology, assimilate it, and then apply it for an innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989). Some latecomers are indeed able to absorb imported technologies and 
quickly develop innovations in order to seize booming market opportunities. 
Others without enough absorptive capacity can use the most complex channel of 
open innovation, namely mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Although it is complex 
in terms of investment, operations and commitment of resources (Marks and 
Mirvis, 1998), M&A is the fastest track to acquire a full range of resources and 
allows latecomers to import technologies as well as other relevant innovation 
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assets, such as absorptive capacity, complementary assets and R&D equipment. 
Thus, the research covering ITL and M&A is able to explain the effectiveness of 
open innovation on a latecomer‘s innovation performance.  
The development of ITL has a long history. Since the mid-1980s, the establishment 
of intellectual property (IP) protection has increased firms‘ willingness to perform 
out-licensing and technology utilization beyond their boundaries (Gallini, 2002; 
Dahlander and Gannb, 2010). Latecomers may find innovative opportunities with 
other firms who own the IP. The gradual maturity of the IP system promotes 
latecomers as licensees to participate in the development of other components or 
associated products (Chesbrough et al., 2006). In addition to exploring the 
environmental readiness, researchers (Link et al., 1983; Atuahene-Gima, 1993) 
have investigated two important conditions used by latecomers to decide whether 
to license or not: (1) the firm‘s characteristics and (2) the management‘s 
perceptions. The transition from opportunity identification to licensing decision is 
one of the two stages needed for successful ITL (Atuahene-Gima, 1993). The other 
stage is the post-adoption stage that encompasses technology adoption to 
innovation performance (Atuahene-Gima, 1993). However, the determinants for 
the post-adoption stage are limited, primarily due to licensing experience, and the 
impact of licensing experience on actual innovation performance is still 
inconclusive (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Álvarez et al., 2002; Johnson, 2002; Tsai 
and Wang, 2009). The existing literature has yet to view the determinants 
regarding the nature of technology as playing a significant role in ITL strategy 
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(Arora and Gambardella, 2010). Thus, I believe it would be promising to examine 
the determinants related to the nature of the technology in ITL adoption by 
latecomers. This research will shed new light on how the ITL strategy impacts 
innovation. 
Though complex, M&A has advantages over the other open innovation 
mechanisms, because it allows latecomers to maximize the benefits of resources 
transfer from a target and also reduces the number of competitors in the field. 
Indeed, an increasing number of latecomers have used M&A as a way to increase 
innovation. However, earlier empirical studies concluded that M&A had a negative 
or an insignificant impact on a recipient‘s innovation performance (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996; Ornaghi, 2006; Danzon et al., 2007). Hence, researchers find it 
difficult to explain why and how latecomers utilize M&A based on the traditional 
wisdom to maximize synergies in developed economies (Seth, 1990; Cording et al., 
2002).  
During M&A, the relatively low absorptive capacity associated with inferior 
knowledge accumulation places a lot of pressure on latecomers to internalize the 
acquired resources; this does not usually occur for incumbents in developed 
economies. Without the certain capability paired with optimized learning efforts, 
latecomers find it difficult to capture the value embedded in the acquired sources. 
As the nature of learning is neither costless nor automatic, latecomers need 
purposeful learning to astutely proceed with the strategic choice in the analysis of 
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potential targets (Bell, 1984; Teece, 2000). Thus, it is particularly worthwhile to 
conduct a more in-depth study along the line of latecomers‘ strategic intentions and 
target selections.  
The aforementioned scattered results from both ITL and M&A research still could 
not satisfactorily explain how open innovation affects a latecomer‘s innovation 
performance. Therefore, Essay One and Essay Two will attempt to resolve the 
above issues regarding the ITL and M&A practices of latecomers from emerging 
economies. 
1.1.4 Combined Utilization of Open Innovation and Disruptive Innovation  
After investigating the impact of open innovation on the innovation performance 
of latecomers, this thesis further explores the application of open innovation in a 
specific type of innovation – disruptive innovation. Disruptive innovation indicates 
the favourable innovation trajectory for latecomers making use of technology to 
achieve innovation. Without the external resources available through the channel 
of open innovation, latecomers may not be able to solve all of the challenges in 
developing disruptive innovation. However, the utilization of the two combined 
innovation strategies may promote innovation.  
As one of the latecomer strategies, disruptive innovation has received increasing 
attention in the recent technological innovation management literature. Being 
technologically isolated from the world centres of innovation, latecomers, 
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especially those from emerging economies, are more likely to develop simpler, 
cheaper products that are of a good-enough standard to enter a market that is less 
attractive to incumbents. Purposeful value creation for the low-end or a new 
market is known as a disruptive innovation path that enables latecomers to disrupt 
the incumbents. The success of latecomers‘ disruptive innovation depends on 
product competition and is triggered by the performance oversupply of existing 
products by incumbents in the mainstream market (Christensen, 1997). Thus far, 
the existing literature has only examined disruptive innovation from an 
independent firm‘s view – either the incumbent or the latecomer (Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003; Utterback and Acee, 2005; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006) without 
interaction between the two. However, the popularity of the open innovation 
strategy (Chesbrough et al., 2006) is due to its emphasis on the cooperation 
between firms. The existing literature seems to ignore the potential cooperation in 
developing disruptive innovation (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Spedale, 2003; 
Utterback and Acee, 2005; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006; Hüsig and Hipp, 2009). 
Therefore, further exploration of the combined utilization of open innovation and 
disruptive innovation could have far-reaching implications. Essay Three will 
investigate this opportunity. 
 
1.2 Objectives and Significance of the Thesis  
The research gaps that this thesis addresses are summarized below: 
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A. The benefits of open innovation have been widely studied for firms in 
developed economies, but the existing literature has not adequately 
investigated the impact of open innovation on latecomer cases in emerging 
economies. Specifically, the degree of improvements to a latecomer‘s 
innovation performance through open innovation is still debatable. It is 
possible that latecomers with distinct characteristics have developed new 
strategies when conducting open innovation that account for their tremendous 
growth over the last decade. Furthermore, the important determinants regarding 
the nature of the technology affecting the effectiveness of open innovation 
have not received much attention. Few studies have examined these 
determinants in latecomers‘ strategic choice of a target (either technology or 
partner) through open innovation, or their impacts on the subsequent 
innovation performance.  
B. With regard to the type of innovation favoured by latecomers, the application 
of open innovation in commercializing disruptive innovation needs to be 
investigated. Although disruptive innovation has been widely discussed as one 
of the most important catching-up strategies used by latecomers to 
economically surpass incumbents, cooperative scenarios between latecomers 
and incumbents via open innovation have yet to be studied. In other words, it is 
not known whether and how open innovation can be combined with disruptive 
innovation.  
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In line with the above research gaps, the research objectives of this thesis are 
summarized below: 
To address Gap A, the two specific objectives are to: 
 explore technology newness
1
 as a determinant of a latecomer licensee‘s 
innovation performance and examine the impact of the ITL strategy.  
 explore technology distance
2
 as a determinant of a latecomer acquirer‘s 
innovation performance and examine the measure of successful M&A for 
latecomers in emerging economies. 
Of the open innovation mechanisms, it is understood that ITL and M&A give an 
effective and efficient view for studying the effectiveness of technical learning 
from external resources. From simple technology transfer by ITL to a full range of 
resource acquisitions by M&A, this thesis attempts to discover latecomer strategies 
to internalize imported resources for indigenous R&D development. Other open 
innovation mechanisms, such as strategic alliance and joint venture, are not central 
to the investigation of open innovation in latecomer cases and are thus not 
discussed in this thesis. 
To address Gap B, the specific objective is to: 
                                                 
1
 Technology newness, being an important determinant regarding the nature of technologies – 
technology age, is an important representative of technology value in the extant licensing literature. 
The relevant details are given in Chapter Two. 
2
 Technology distance, being an important determinant regarding the nature of technologies – 
technology domain, is an important proxy of the strategic intention of acquiring firm in the extant 
M&A literature. The relevant details are given in Chapter Three. 
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 investigate the role of open innovation in disruptive innovation processes 
and the conditions under which latecomers can combine open innovation 
and disruptive innovation for their technological catching-up. 
The application of open innovation in the development of disruptive innovation 
can be considered an ideal strategic combination for latecomers‘ catching-up. 
Since the mid-1990s, there have been some remarkably successful disruptive 
innovation cases by latecomers. In contrast, the other two types of sustaining 
innovation, i.e., incremental and radical innovation, tend not to be favoured by 
technologically laggard firms, and are thus beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It is clear from the reviews of China‘s high-tech industries3 over the last decade 
that some latecomers have achieved remarkable catching-up with market leaders; 
others, however, have faced serious difficulties. This successful catching-up has 
undoubtedly contributed to China becoming the world‘s fastest growing economy, 
and thus the strategic reasons behind it are worth investigating. This thesis 
attempts to explain why some latecomers are able to use open innovation 
successfully while others are not. In this thesis, the latecomers are Chinese firms 
                                                 
3
 The widely adopted definition of high-tech industries was established by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1986. The high-tech industries were 
identified based upon their high R&D intensities (R&D spending as a percentage of production) 
relative to other manufacturing industries. Based on the OECD classification (Hatzichronoglou, 
1997), the high-tech industries are cataloged by Chinese government into five sectors, namely 
pharmaceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft, electronic and telecommunications, computers and office 
machinery and medical equipments and meters. Among the five sectors, electronic and 
telecommunications has been the most developed sector and has performed the most innovation 
related activities in China. According to China Statistics Yearbook (2011), the sector of electronic 
and telecommunications had the best output value, the highest expenditure of new product 
development and the most patenting activities in the past decade. Thus, this thesis mainly studies 
the industries in this high-tech sector. 
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operating in high-tech industries that have caught up with existing incumbents 
mostly from developed economies, in several ways. The first two essays 
investigate the traditional ways of open innovation through ITL and M&A. The 
third essay explores the renewed type of innovation that successfully uses 
disruptive technologies; this is a small set of latecomers. 
Although the findings in these essays are based on cases from China, the results 
may be generalized to latecomers from other emerging economies, particularly 
those with sizeable domestic markets, such as India, Brazil and Russia. This is 
because the main characteristics of the focal firms in this research are true of all 
latecomers in other countries. The results of this thesis would provide an in-depth 
view of utilization of open innovation by latecomers. It will add on to the strategic 
management of technological innovation literature. This thesis would offer insights 
regarding latecomers‘ strategic choice by considering the significant determinants 
of technology newness and technology distance in open innovation. The findings 
regarding these two significant determinants may uncover hidden management 
wisdoms about open innovation for latecomers. Further investigation of the 
application of open innovation in the context of the type of innovation favoured by 
latecomers, i.e., disruptive innovation, would provide more guidance for 
latecomers to effectively use open innovation strategies and catch up more surely 
and quickly.  
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1.3 Organization of the Thesis  
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 (Essay One) elaborates the ITL 
strategy – the simplest open innovation mechanism – for latecomers. Chapter 3 
(Essay Two) discusses M&A strategy – the most complex open innovation 
mechanism – for latecomers. After confirming the impact of open innovation on 
latecomers‘ growth in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 (Essay Three) investigates the 
application of open innovation in the disruptive innovation setting. Chapters 2 to 4 
present the three essays, each with an introduction, theory and hypotheses, data 
and methods, results, discussion and summary. Chapter 5 concludes by discussing 
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                                                    CHAPTER 2. 
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND INNOVATION PERFORMANCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The phenomenal rise in the number of latecomers from emerging economies who 
have become fast followers and caught up with industry leaders has drawn the 
attention of researchers. Inward technology licensing (ITL) has been emphasized 
as one of the most important strategies that latecomers use to build up their 
competitive advantage, especially in technology-intensive industries (Teece, 1986; 
Fosfuri, 2000, 2006; Johnson, 2002; Laursen et al., 2010). Successful ITL is 
associated with the process of identifying a licensing opportunity, making a 
licensing decision and adopting licensed-in technologies. Earlier studies have 
investigated the determinants of opportunity identification and licensing decisions, 
and have identified three categories, namely firm characteristics, management 
perceptions and external environment (Atuahene-Gima, 1993). However, the 
adoption of licensed-in technologies has received less attention. Thus, this essay 
aims to identify the important factors in adopting licensed-in technologies and 
reveal their relationships with innovation performance. 
The stream of research exploring the relationship between firms‘ ITL strategy and 
their subsequent innovation performance has shown mixed results. Álvarez et al.‘s 
(2002) findings underscored the significance of ITL strategy for accelerating a 
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latecomer‘s technological catching-up. Ahuja and Katila (2001) examined the size 
of technology acquisitions and determined that size had a positive impact on a 
firm‘s innovation performance. On the contrary, Johnson‘s (2002) study showed 
that inward licensing experience had a negative impact on innovation performance. 
Although Johnson‘s (2002) work showed a firm‘s internal R&D to be an important 
factor influencing the association between licensing inputs and innovation 
performance, recent findings by Tsai and Wang (2009) have raised doubts about 
this association and showed that ITL expenditure did not contribute significantly to 
innovation performance in Taiwan, even under the moderating effect of internal 
R&D. Thus, the precise means by which inward licensing experience affects 
innovation performance is still inconclusive. Each of these studies furthered our 
understanding of the micro-foundation of licensing, but did not shed much light on 
the determinants of purposeful ITL strategy.  
This essay attempts to resolve the above mixed results by investigating the learning 
by licensing effect among Chinese latecomers. Given Chinese latecomers‘ 
remarkable technological catching-up over the last decade, their learning is likely 
to have relied on technology transferred through licensing. Based on data from the 
World Bank (2007), Figure 2-1 shows how Chinese latecomers‘ licensing expenses 
increased dramatically from 1998 to 2005. Among my sample of four high-tech 
industries in China, pure technology transfer grew steadily from 1998 to 2003 and 
has dramatically increased since mid-2004, as shown by the number of licensing 
agreements in Figure 2-2. During the period 1995-2008, it was reported that China 
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contributed 22.9% of the total number of patents filed with the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), ranking third in the world for patenting after Japan 
and USA (WIPO, 2011).  Some Chinese latecomers such as Huawei, ZTE and 
Haier, even ranked among top patent applicants in their particular fields (WIPO, 
2011). Thus, investigating the licensing activities of Chinese latecomers will 
certainly help uncover the ITL strategies that promote innovation.  
 
Figure 2-1. Licensing expenses in China (Work Bank, 2007) 
 
Figure 2-2. Number of licenses in China‘s high-tech industries 
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Considering the nature of latecomers‘ inferior resources, the two critical factors 
that can promote innovation performance are (1) the number of licenses and (2) the 
age of licensed-in technology; these represent the ITL strategic choice embedded 
in the overall strategy of the firm. The number of licenses is a direct measure of 
licensing activities and represents the extent of ITL, while the age of licensed-in 
technology is an important measure of its value. Although Rockett (1990a, b) 
extended the licensing literature to cover the role of technology age in outward 
licensing, there is a lack of research investigating this important factor in the post-
adoption stage of ITL. By focusing on the above two factors, the main goal of this 
essay is to investigate the strategic choice of ITL on the growth of innovation in 
the post-adoption stage. This essay borrows from organizational learning theory
4
 
and examines the respective impacts of the number of licenses and the age of 
licensed-in technology on the subsequent innovation performance of a licensee, as 
well as the moderating effect of absorptive capacity on the above two relationships. 
 
                                                 
4
 The concept of organizational learning theory is initiated by Cangelosi and Dill (1965) and origins 
from behavior and psychology theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Weick, 1979). The organizational 
learning theory studies models and theories about the way an organization learns and adapts. There 
are two levels of analysis of organizational learning theory, namely individual level and 
organizational level. In this study, I mainly focus on the organizational level. An organization is 
seen as an adaptive system that has the ability to sense the changes from its environment (both 
internal and external) and adapt accordingly in the organizational learning theory. The effectiveness 
of organizational learning is found strongly associated with absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), which is the part I mainly adopted from organizational learning theory. The 
absorptive capacity of an organization is treated as a trade-off between the efficiency of internal 
communication and the ability to explore and exploit information from other organizations or the 
environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
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2.2 Theory and Hypothesis  
A wide range of studies have identified licensing as one of the most important 
mechanisms of technology transfer (Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Fosfuri, 
2000; Chesbrough, 2003; Arora and Gambardella, 2010). This strategy adds 
additional inputs to a licensee‘s technology landscape and this inward flow of 
technology has the potential to help the licensee build competitive advantage by 
integrating internal R&D and external technologies (Grant, 1996). Leone et al. 
(2009) found that firms who undertake ITL have better innovation performances 
compared to non-licensing firms. Furthermore, Álvarez et al. (2002) claimed that 
technology acquisition by ITL is a potentially significant means for latecomers to 
accelerate their technological catching-up.  
There are both environmental drives and internal motivations for latecomers to 
adopt ITL. Rapid technology change, aggressive competition in technological 
capability, and strengthened intellectual property protection create catching-up 
barriers for latecomers who want to access and adapt technological advances 
(Grant, 1996; Lee, 1996; Leone et al., 2009). However, licensing from industry 
leaders allows latecomers to tap into external resources. In addition, ITL helps 
latecomers leverage their initial competitive advantage to enjoy the free-rider 
effect (Lee and Lim, 2001; Mathews, 2002), which further promotes their internal 
motivations for ITL. The internal motivations for latecomers‘ ITL can be 
categorized as passive or active. The conventional research (Lubatkin, 1983; 
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Roberts and Berry, 1985; Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Chatterji, 1996; Kollmer and 
Dowlin, 2004) treated ITL as new product development or a market entry strategy 
to reduce the financial risk of R&D and time-to-market. Due to their initially weak 
technological capability and the entry order disadvantage (Mathews, 2002), ITL by 
latecomers has been traditionally viewed as a passive reaction to compensate for 
technological shortcomings or a means to break the industry‘s entry barrier (Hill, 
1997; Lowe and Taylor, 1998). However, recent research has viewed ITL as a 
means to open up learning opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Pitkethly, 
2001) and spur inventive activities (Leone et al., 2009). ITL has become a popular 
strategy for speeding up a licensee‘s endogenous technology change and 
technological capability development over time (Johnson, 2002; Tsai and Wang, 
2009). By relying on a licensing channel to possess proven technology, latecomers 
can focus more on their own potentially superior or competing technology (Hill, 
1997). Hence, ITL is widely accepted as a potential means for latecomers to build 
competitive advantages by adopting licensed-in technologies (Grant, 1996). 
According to organizational learning theory, the adoption of licensed-in 
technology can be viewed as a learning process (Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen et al., 
2010). The technologies available in the market are potential learning opportunities 
for licensees (Pitkethly, 2001; Johnson, 2002). Learning by licensing is associated 
with a firm‘s ability to identify and acquire licensed-in technology, and then 
process it into innovation. Moreover, it demands that licensees‘ R&D efforts act 
not only as a direct input to innovation performance, but also as a means of 
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absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Licensed-in technologies enlarge 
the licensee‘s pool of existing knowledge stock (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2004), and 
thus indirectly favours the absorptive capacity of the licensee (Katrak, 1997). If 
they possess a certain absorptive capacity, licensees may sense the potential of 
licensed-in technology to generate innovation by recombining the knowledge 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). This knowledge recombination benefits from 
alternative technology inputs via ITL and is regarded as an important strategy for 
latecomers to catch up on their technology (Kodama, 1995; Kim, 1997). Thus, 
learning by licensing is a viable strategy to promote innovation for the licensee 
(Mathews and Cho, 1999; Johnson, 2002). In practice, not all licensees can 
successfully carry out the learning by licensing because the potential technological 
benefits depend on effective learning and implementation (Dahlman et al., 1987). 
Obtaining external technologies by purchasing patents together with relevant 
support, such as experience, expertise and R&D inputs, is required to realize the 
benefits of these technologies. Without adequate capability, licensees will have a 
hard time identifying technology opportunities and making full use of licensed-in 
technologies. The catching-up literature (Winiecki, 1987) also exposed the failure 
of Soviet-type economies‘ technology acquisitions and highlighted the difficulties 
in adopting licensed-in technologies thereby visualizing the importance of strategic 
management in ITL adoption.  
The effectiveness of ITL adoption, along with subsequent innovation performance, 
has been widely studied. Research by Willmore (1991) and Lee (1996) presented 
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the alleged positive effect of licensing on internal R&D. Johnson (2002) captured 
the positive relationship between inward licensing experience and patent 
generation by a licensee. Indeed, ITL has been proven to play an important role in 
influencing the innovation performance of a licensee, albeit most likely with a time 
lag (Xie and Wu, 2003; Fabrizio, 2009). Empirical evidence by Mansfield et al. 
(1982) indicated that the average ―start-up lag‖ for international technology 
transfer is two years. This implies that licensees cannot immediately improve their 
innovation performance; rather, it results from the period of learning. Therefore, I 
use subsequent patent generation (within three years immediately after licensing) 
as a measurement of the innovation output of ITL strategy. This essay objectively 
analyzes patent generation by Chinese latecomers who adopted ITL in high-tech 
industries where knowledge is highly intensive, markets are difficult to penetrate, 
cost advantages are minimal, and strategies of linkage and leverage are important. 
Since all latecomers from China share a similar regulatory environment and 
experience roughly the same environmental forces (Xie and Wu, 2003), I am able 
to focus on the factors of strategic management in ITL adoption. This essay does 
not assert that these ITL factors are the only source of heterogeneity among 
licensees, only that they are the most important. This is further discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
In the latecomer context, one key factor embedded in the overall strategy of a 
licensee is the number of licenses. The number of licenses is a direct link to the 
extent of ITL and financial exposure of the latecomer. Since latecomers lack 
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resources (Mathews, 2002), the limitations of R&D inputs and existing capability 
constrain the number of licenses and hinder the learning effect in ITL adoption. A 
larger number of licenses means that more licensed-in technologies can be 
translated into learning opportunities for the licensee. Moreover, licensing-in 
technologies can enlarge the internal knowledge base and extend the innovation 
scope by boosting knowledge recombination (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; 
Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2004). Beyond a certain level, 
latecomers may face difficulties absorbing a large number of licensed-in 
technologies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) due to their inferior technological 
capability; an excessive number of licensed-in technologies may hamper the 
efficiency of learning (March, 1991). This is because adopting more licensed-in 
technologies requires more R&D efforts to spur effective learning, including 
human and financial capital support. The extra effort required is unsustainable for 
latecomers who often suffer the resource constraints. For instance, internal 
intelligences are important assets for realizing both tangible and intangible 
technology transfers by cooperating with licensors (Atuahene-Gima, 1993; 
Fleisher et al., 2010). The fact is that these intelligences are always in short supply 
for latecomers in emerging economies due to the lack of human capital 
accumulation (Liu, 1998). Moreover, latecomers rarely have sufficient financial 
capital for external hires. Thus, it is difficult for latecomers to benefit from a large 
number of licensed-in technologies. Even worse, too much reliance on ITL may 
affect internal R&D development because it diminishes the staff‘s motivation to 
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innovate themselves (Pillai, 1979). If a licensee only uses licensed-in technologies 
as they are or does not bother to adapt or customize the technologies according to 
its own needs, the benefits of learning cannot be optimized to develop its 
innovative capability. Therefore, I believe that excessive ITL impedes a licensee‘s 
subsequent innovation performance and propose Hypothesis 1: 
H1. The number of licenses has a curvilinear (an inverted U) effect on the 
subsequent innovation performance of a licensee.  
Considering the limited resources allocated to ITL, latecomers should carefully 
select the technology to be licensed to ensure that innovation can be achieved. 
Before licensing-in decisions, latecomers should have the capacity to identify 
which is the proper technology that they should learn from. It is because this 
possible technology change triggered by licensing-in decisions can be incorporated 
to the production and thus affects the productivity in the post-licensing stage 
(Nelson, 1964). As emphasized by Fosfuri (2000) and Ziedonis (2007), ITL is an 
important instrument of strategic choice regarding the vintage of technology (or 
the equivalent quality in their research) beyond a simple entry mode (or the right to 
use the technology). To examine the quality of technology, technology age was 
first proposed by Rockett (1990a, b) as an important determinant that licensors can 
use to extract rents from licensees. I argue that technology age can be used by a 
licensee as a measure to capture returns on innovation from ITL.  
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Technology age has been stressed as a critical factor affecting knowledge 
recombination and, as a result, innovation performance (Nerkar, 2003). All 
technologies depreciate in value as they grow old (Perez and Soete, 1988; Tanaka 
et al., 2007). Since old technologies have been extensively used by competing 
firms for extended periods and have likely been replaced by new technologies, 
they are less valuable as inputs that contribute to innovation (Katila, 2002). In 
contrast, recent technologies offer promising technological opportunities, and thus 
they are more interesting sources for knowledge recombination (Kodama, 1995; 
Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). 
In addition, recent technologies can help latecomers maintain a good fit between 
themselves and the competitive environment (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). In high-
tech industries where the technology life cycle is short, new technologies may 
quickly become outdated. Besides endogenous technology development, 
latecomers can update their patent portfolios by importing recent patents. These 
recent patents can facilitate a market entry to an emerging technological field 
(Fosfuri, 2000). During the early development of a technological field, every firm 
is new to the area and the relevant patents available in the technology market are 
likely to be very recent. As the technology matures, latecomers who license the 
recent technology enjoy the learning curve advantages (Nelson, 1995; Shane, 
2001). The learning curve embodies the initial difficulty of learning; the possible 
returns of learning come after the initial familiarity is gained (Ritter and Schooler, 
2002). The initial learning takes latecomers some time, possibly years, to absorb 
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the licensed-in technology to the level where they can generate innovation based 
on the accumulation of learning-by-doing (von Hippel, 1988). If the licensed-in 
technology is recent, it is more likely to be advantageous even after ITL adoption.  
Based on the above arguments, I propose Hypothesis 2: 
H2. The age of licensed-in technology has a negative effect on the subsequent 
innovation performance of a licensee.  
The existing literature has suggested that cultivating an in-house technological 
capability is critical for maximizing the learning outcomes of ITL adoption 
(Kumar et al., 1999; Tsai and Wang, 2009). Song et al. (2005) pointed out that 
internal R&D efforts have a significant effect on the adoption of technology. Sen 
and Rubenstein (1990) claimed that the cumulative efficiency of past technology 
learning could increase the effectiveness of external technology adoption. In other 
words, by adding R&D inputs over time, technological knowledge can be 
accumulated (Drejer, 2000; Schoenecker and Swanson, 2002). Accumulative 
technological knowledge (as the notion of existing technological capability in this 
study) represents a licensee‘s absorptive capacity to recognize the value of 
technology, assimilate it, and apply it to innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 
March, 1991; Hall et al., 2001). A number of scholars (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Stock et al., 2001) have hypothesized that a high level of accumulative 
technological knowledge can lead to inertia and rigidity, resulting in an inward-
looking tendency. However, I do not expect this factor to be important in this study, 
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which focuses on latecomers from China. Unlike firms in advanced countries, all 
of the latecomer firms covered in my study still have relatively low level of 
technological knowledge accumulation. Interestingly, a recent study of Taiwanese 
high-tech firms (Tsai and Wang, 2009) has also found a net positive moderating 
effect of accumulative technology capability. Given that the Taiwanese firms 
generally have higher level of knowledge accumulation than the Chinese firms 
(both samples in the same high-tech sector of electronic and telecommunications), 
I can safely infer that the inertia/rigidity factor is unlikely to be a significant factor 
for the latecomer firms in this study. Therefore, the well-established technological 
capability can improve the absorption of imported technologies from ITL and 
enhance the effectiveness of learning on latecomers‘ innovation performance (von 
Hippel, 1988; March, 1991; Gambardella, 1992; Mowery et al., 1996; Grünfeld, 
2003). It implies that the existing level of the technological capability determines 
the extent to which licensee can efficiently adopt licensed-in technologies. When 
the number of licenses is certain, the strong existing technological capability may 
boost the effectiveness of adopting licensed-in technologies and result in a better 
innovation performance. If the number is uncertain, weak existing technological 
capability may limit adoption to a very small number of licenses due to the low 
level of absorptive capacity.  
During the course of technology utilization, the post-licensing innovation 
performance may also be enhanced by knowledge recombination in an integrated 
knowledge pool (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1996; 
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Fleming, 2001). An enlarged knowledge pool can be created via external 
technology acquisition channels, such as ITL. Licensed-in technologies can add to 
the existing knowledge pool and serve as sources of possible knowledge 
recombination for renewed innovations. Furthermore, sizeable existing knowledge 
base (strong existing technological capability in this study) increases the 
possibilities for licensed-in technologies to be combined with existing technologies 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Kogut and 
Zander, 1996; Fleming, 2001; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2004). The above arguments 
imply that, if a licensee imports a greater number of technologies, its subsequent 
innovation performance will only improve when it has a competent existing 
technological capability.  
In addition, existing technological capability allows licensees to enjoy direct 
benefits from the vintages of licensed-in technologies, such as technology age. Old 
technology has limited value for innovation, while recent technology has greater 
potential (Perez and Soete, 1988; Katila, 2002; Tanaka et al., 2007). However, only 
firms with competent technological capability can realize the potential benefits of 
recent technology. As the level of existing technological capability increases, more 
technological opportunities embedded in the recent technology can be identified 
and explored (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; March, 1991; Hall et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the more recent technologies a licensee imports, the better its 
subsequent innovation performance will be when it has a strong enough existing 
technological capability.  
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In sum, the above arguments lead to the following hypotheses regarding the 
moderating role of a licensee‘s existing technological capacity:  
H3. A licensee’s existing technological capability positively moderates the 
relationship between the number of licenses and the subsequent innovation 
performance. 
H4. A licensee’s existing technological capability negatively moderates the 
relationship between the age of licensed-in technology and the subsequent 
innovation performance. 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology  
2.3.1 Sample and Data 
This essay uses a licensing dataset obtained from the State Intellectual Property 
Office of China (SIPO), which includes both domestic and international licenses 
obtained by Chinese licensees from 1998 to 2009. Each record contains the 
licensor‘s name, licensee‘s name, name and application number of the licensed-in 
patent and the registration date of licensing. This sample focuses on patent 
licensing transactions by Chinese firms in the high-tech sector of electronic and 
telecommunications, including telecommunications, mobile, IT, and consumer 
electronics industries, completed during the observation period from 1998 to 2005. 
This provides an initial set of ‗licensing-in data points‘ for 154 firms.  
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The extra patent data for each licensee is also collected from SIPO. Additional 
information about each licensee, such as the year established and number of 
employees, is retrieved from the company website, annual reports, or public media. 
This additional information allows us to cross-link the original dataset with other 
sources of information that are necessary for my analysis. The extended data for 
three firms is unavailable, so they are not included in the empirical test. 
2.3.2 Variables  
Dependent Variable 
Innovation performance: The number of patents has been widely used as a 
measurement of innovation performance in prior empirical research (Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1994; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Hall et al., 2001). Thus, I adopt 
this variable and use patent generation as a proxy indicator of the innovation 
performance for each licensee. I count the number of patents applied for by each 
licensee within three, four or five years after the licensing year. If the licensee has 
multiple licensing years, I average the patent counts. The average number of 
patents generated by each licensee within three years after licensing is considered 
as the dependent variable. The number of patents generated within four or five 
years is used to construct the variables that I use to check the robustness of the 
outcomes.  
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Independent Variables 
Number of licenses (NL): This independent variable is the total number of 
licensing agreements for each licensee over the period 1998-2005. It includes both 
international patent licensing and domestic patent licensing.  
Age of licensed-in technology (ALT): This independent variable is the time lag 
between the application year of the patent licensed in and the registration year of 
the licensing agreement from SIPO. First, I compute the time lag for each licensing 
agreement. Next, I average the time lags for each licensee over the period 1998-
2005. 
Moderating Variable 
Existing technological capability (ETC): Because existing knowledge stock may 
influence the absorptive capacity for learning (Perez and Soete, 1988; Laursen et 
al., 2010), I use each licensee‘s existing patent stock in SIPO to measure this 
moderating variable. First, I count the number of patents applied for by each 
licensee during the five years prior to licensing at the level of each licensing 
agreement. Next, I average the cumulative number of patents during the five years 
prior to licensing for each licensee. This value is treated as the measurement of 
existing technological capability.   
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Control Variables 
Age of internal technology (AIT): Theoretical research about learning (Sorensen 
and Stuart, 2000; Katila, 2002; Nerkar, 2003) suggests that technology age in the 
existing knowledge stock has a significant impact on innovation. Thus, the average 
age of internal technology is a variable that should be controlled for. Using data 
about each licensee‘s existing patent stock for the five years prior to licensing, this 
variable is calculated by computing the time lag between the application year of 
the patent and the first licensing year in SIPO.  
Diversity age of internal technology (DAIT): The impact of the diversity of the age 
of internal technology is also considered an important factor (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989; Katila, 2002). Thus, I use a standard deviation of the age of the internal 
patent stock to measure the age of the licensee‘s internal technology.  
Firm age: Since the number of years of operations can influence innovation 
performance, I include firm age as a control variable to capture prior experience in 
technology development activities. Firm age is defined as the number of years 
from the establishing year of the licensee to 2009. 
Firm size dummy: Many studies have reported that firm size influences 
innovativeness in learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Henderson and Cockburn, 
1996). The number of employees has been widely used as a measure of firm size 
(Ettlie and Rubenstein, 1987; Calof, 1994). To determine the size of each licensee, 
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I count its employees. Since less than one third of the firms‘ employee numbers are 
listed and the numbers for private firms are unreliable, I transformed this variable 
into a dummy variable. In line with the Institute Für Mittelstandsforschung (Small 
Business Research Institute) and United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), firms with less than 500 employees are defined as 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and those with more than 500 employees 
are large enterprises (Commission of the European Communities, 1985; Corsten, 
1987; Neelamegham, 1992). Thus, a value of 1 represents a large enterprise with 
more than 500 employees. If the employee number is equal to or less than 500, the 
value is coded as 0.  
Regional dummy: Prior research has shown that regional institutional policies, 
geographical knowledge spillover, business ties and local competition affect how 
firms acquire products and process knowledge (Barney, 1991; Koschatzky, 1998). 
Therefore, a regional dummy is added as a control variable. I control this effect by 
identifying the Chinese province that each licensee is located in and sorting them 
based on the total number of patents from their province over the period 1985-
2009. Since the number of 1,000,000 patents is about the average accumulated 
patent number of the province that my sample firms located, I use this average 
number as a benchmark to measure this dummy variable. The value of this variable 
is set to 1 for licensees located in Chinese provinces where the total number of 
patents is equal to or greater than 1,000,000 , and 0 for licensees located in Chinese 
provinces where the total number of patents is less than 1,000,000.  
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Licensor dummy: I control the interrogate linkage between the licensor and 
licensee using this dummy variable. If the licensee has a sole licensor, meaning all 
of its patents are licensed from just one licensor, the value of licensor dummy is 
coded as 0. Otherwise, it is coded as 1.  
Year dummy: This dummy variable indicates a particular licensing year recorded 
in SIPO over the period 1998-2005. The year is set to1998 by default. As there are 
not enough observations from 1999 to 2001, I combine the year dummy 1 (1999), 
year dummy 2 (2000) and year dummy 3 (2001) together and control for these 
years as year dummy 123. Year dummy 4, 5, 6 and 7 refer to the particular years 
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
2.3.3 Methods 
This section describes the econometric approach used to conduct the empirical 
analysis in this essay; it is also adopted in the next essay. Because the dependent 
variable is a count variable – number of patents, this study uses a negative 
binomial regression analysis. The count data usually exhibits over-dispersion and 
has only non-negative integer values (Maddala, 1983). To analyze the count data, 
the linear regression model based on the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
violated to explain the normally distributed errors. The appropriate models for the 
count data are built on the Poisson probability distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998; Greene, 2008). However, the basic Poisson model only applies to count data 
that has the same mean and variance. The Poisson model does not fit well for this 
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study because the count data – number of patents – differs across observations 
(heterogeneity) and its variance usually exceeds the mean
5
. Thus, the negative 
binomial regression model is the standard choice for the over-dispersion data of 
countable patents (Hausman et al., 1984; Kennedy, 1998). The negative binomial 
regression model also has the advantage of capturing both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity in the analysis, whereas only observed heterogeneity is 
captured in the Poisson regression model (Long, 1997). To avoid the negative 
value of the dependent variable, the negative binomial regression model 
parameterizes the independent variables as an exponential function (Long, 1997): 
                                                Yj= exp ( αX1j + β*X2j + …..γ* Cj + εj)  
 
Where Yj is the number of patents generated by a firm j, Xnj is the vector of the 
acquisition variables to be tested and Cj is the vector of the control variables 
affecting Yj.  This specification implies that the number of patents by a firm in any 
year is randomly distributed following the negative binomial model. 
Based on the theoretical expectations regarding innovation performance and the 
determinants of the number of licenses, age of licensed-in technology and existing 
technological capability, the above model is used in this study to explain a 
licensee’s innovation performance in terms of number of patents. Furthermore, this 
                                                 
5
 I calculate the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for overdispersion in this essay and the next essay. 
The LM test is used in the Poisson model versus the negative binomial model (Johansson, 1995; 
Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). The results indicate that the effects of overdispersion are statistically 
significant, which is against the Poisson assumption of the equality of the mean and variance. Thus, 
the negative binomial model that can accommodate overdispersion is more appropriate than the 
Poisson model. 
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study adopts a firm-level analysis rather than a firm-year panel due to an inherent 
problem with the data provided by the data source – SIPO. Specifically, in the 
period of observation, the number of inward licensing deals are not made available 
for every year, but are instead lumped together across several years, resulting in 
zero entries for some years and very high figures for certain years. Indeed, for 
many of the sampled firms
6
, their licenses appear only in one particular licensing 
year, with zero entries for all other years. Because of this problem of data 
aggregation across multiple years, a firm-year panel analysis would not be 
appropriate. Indeed, I have run a firm-year panel test and found the results to be 
poor due to the violation of the pooled-analysis assumption of equal population 
variances. Thus, I adopt a firm-level negative binomial analysis. In addition, a 
sensitivity analysis is carried out later to test the robustness of the results.  
 
2.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are presented in Table 
2-1. The coefficients reveal that the analysis does not suffer from multicollinearity 
in the interaction terms between existing technological capability (ETC), number 
of licenses (NL), and age of licensed-in technology (ALT). Table 2-2 shows the 
                                                 
6
 For example, Shenzhen Shanling Electronics Ltd., one of my sample firms, has 726 licensing-in 
deals registered in 2005; Dongwan DaXin Science and Technology Ltd. has 542 licensing-in deals 
only in the year of 2005; and Shenzhen Huajia Digital Ltd. has 368 licensing-in deals recorded in 
2005. 
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results of the regression analysis on the effects of NL and ALT, as well as the 
moderating effect of ETC, on the innovation performance of a licensee. Model 1 
presents the base model with all control variables. AIT has an inverted U 
relationship with innovation performance, which is similar to the results of prior 
work by Katila (2002). The impacts of the firm size and regional dummy turn out 
to be significant for the innovation performance. The effect of the licensor dummy 
is insignificant, which means that whether a firm has a sole licensor or many 
licensors does not have a strong impact on the innovation performance. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8   9 10 
1.  Innovation 
performance 
149.53 954.633 1          
2.  NL 19 79.285  -.025 1         
3.  ALT 7.87 2.709  -.098 .094 1        
4.  ETC 10.80 62.951   .438** -.031 -.066 1       
5.  AIT .61   .613 1.335   .266** -.051 -.099 .127 1      
6.  DAIT .175 .469 .176* -.018 -101 .144 .640** 1     
7.  Firm age 13.91 7.122 .061 -.075 .131 .183* .138 .286** 1    
8.  Firm size dummy .36 .483  .191* -.109 -.036   .216** .108 .188* .275** 1   
9.  Regional dummy .95 .225 .037 .043 .177* .040 -.069 .025 -.051 -.005 1  
10. Licensor dummy .29 .456  -.067 .084 -.022 .067 .048 .082 .063 .060 .022 1 
 
 **. Correlation is significant with the P value of 0.01 (2-tailed, significant at 10%) 
 *. Correlation is significant with the P value of 0.05 (2-tailed, significant at 5%) 
 Number of observations (N) =151  
 Notes: Year dummies were included in the analysis but not shown in this table.  
  47 
Table 2-2. Negative binomial regression (Dependent variable = Innovation performance) 
 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 


























-.613    
(1.960)    
 




































-.433**    
(.1808) 
 


































































.0608   





3.818**    
(1.559) 
 










-1.569    
(1.764) 
 



















(1.443)    
 
.0571    
(.0477) 
 

























-1.943   
(1.290) 
 
-.814   
(1.093) 
 
-.904    
(1.000) 
 
 .124    
(.918) 
 
 .388    
(1.396) 
 
-3.152    
(2.984) 
-1.930   
(1.271) 
 
-1.015   
(1.018) 
 
-1.034   
(.956) 
 
.628    
(1.037) 
 
.255    
(1.222) 
   
-3.775   
(3.012) 
-2.261**    
(1.114) 
 





























 .940   
(2.616) 
-1.221    
(1.015) 
 












-.606    
(2.162)  















-.897    
(2.003) 
-1.067    
(.984) 
 
-1.166    
(.724) 
 



















































































































ETC * NL 
 
ETC * NL^2  
 
 
ETC * ALT 
























































    












































 ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, * P<0.1 (2-tailed) 
 N=151;  STANDARD ERRORS IN BRACKET 
  49 
Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 test Hypotheses 1 and 2. Model 2 shows that the 
estimated coefficient of NL does not have a significant effect on the innovation 
performance of a licensee, but Model 4 verifies the inverted U shape effect 
(P<0.05). The age of licensed-in technology (ALT) has a negative impact on 
innovation performance. The results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that ALT has a 
significant negative effect on the innovation performance of a licensee (as 
expected, P<0.01).  
Thus far, the study focuses on the individual effects of NL and ALT on the 
subsequent innovation performance. The rest of the models examine the 
moderating effect of existing technological capability (ETC) on the above two 
relationships, which is visualized in Figure 2-3
7
. Model 5 shows that the 
moderating variable of ETC has a positive impact on the subsequent innovation 
performance. Model 6 and Model 8 examine the moderating effect of ETC on the 
effect of NL on innovation performance. The results from Model 6 show that ETC 
has an alleviating effect on the relationship between NL and innovation 
performance (P<0.05): the interaction term with the linear term of NL is negative, 
while that of the squared term is positive. To gain additional insights, I further 
draw the interaction plots in Set A, Figure 2-3, in support of Hypothesis 3. This 
figure, based on Model 8 and 90 percentiles of the data, shows that there are two 
                                                 
7
 Based on the coefficients of the negative binomial regressions in Table 2-2, I calculate how ETC 
changes the likelihood that a licensee will successfully generate innovation by adopting licensed-in 
technologies (so called incidence-ratio minus 1). The surfaces in both figures - Set A and Set B -
show the impact of ETC on the chance that a firm will successfully adopt licensed-in technologies 
(under the measure of NL and ATL). 
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different ITL strategies that promote the post-licensing innovation. In the case of 
adopting only a few licenses, the licensee still needs to rely on its own R&D in 
order to achieve a better innovation performance. However, a licensee can obtain 
the benefits of a large number of licenses by internalizing licensed-in technologies. 
When importing many external technologies, it would not make sense for the 
quantity to affect the post-licensing innovation performance, only for the existing 
capability of the licensee to absorb the imported technologies. Model 7 and Model 
8 investigate the interaction effect between ALT and ETC on the innovation 
performance of the licensee. The results show that the licensee‘s ETC negatively 
moderates the relationship between ALT and innovation performance (P<0.01), 
which supports Hypothesis 4. In other words, the absorptive capacity of the firm 
has a smaller positive impact on the subsequent innovation performance as the 
technology age increases. The interaction is plotted in Set B, Figure 2-3, based on 
Model 8 and 90 percentile of the data. The pattern is in line with the prediction that, 
with a high existing technological capability, latecomers can take greater 
advantage of recent licensed-in technologies. The positive effect on innovation 
performance only appears when the licensee acquires new technologies. Even with 
a strong existing technological capability, technologies that are more than 4.5 years 
old prior to licensing seem to have no value for subsequent innovation. This 
finding disagrees with the wisdom that ―old is gold‖ (Nerkar, 2003) when 
exploring the value of internal knowledge. 
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Several robustness tests confirm the accuracy of the results. First, I add the 
industry dummy into the model. This shows the similar results as reported above. 
Second, I change the dependent variable of innovation performance in the analysis 
of the full models by adjusting the period of patent counts to three years, four years 
and five years after licensing. The estimated coefficients maintain similar 
empirical results, which support hypotheses H1 to H4.  
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Set B: Interaction of Age of Licensed-in Technology and Existing Technological 
Capability 
 
          Figure 2-3. Interaction plots 
 
 
2.5 Discussion and Summary  
The existing literature has paid little attention to latecomers‘ ITL strategy for 
technological capability development. However, as a significant number of 
Chinese latecomers have successfully become top patent generators, this research 
topic deserves greater attention. Due to their weaker resources, it is important for 
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increase in ITL activities that has been observed in China over the last decade, 
there is an urgent need to investigate the ITL strategy behind the success stories of 
Chinese latecomers. By treating ITL as an integral part of technological strategic 
management, this essay explores how latecomers can make proactive management 
decisions to minimize the risk of licensing and maximize their innovation 
performance.  
This essay explores ITL strategy for latecomers by focusing on two critical factors: 
(1) the number of licenses and (2) the age of licensed-in technology. I found that 
the age of licensed-in technology is a critical factor for the subsequent innovation 
performance of the licensee. As technology becomes old, its value for inward 
licensing depreciates. The age of licensed-in technology also negatively affects the 
positive impact of existing technological capability on innovation performance, 
indicating that older technology is less valuable for implementing a catching-up 
strategy. By considering the factor of age of licensed-in technology, this essay 
reconciles the contradictory research findings about the impact of prior licensing 
experience and determines there is an inverted U relationship between the number 
of licenses and the subsequent innovation performance. Moreover, this relationship 
is positively moderated by a licensee‘s existing technological capability. That is, 
without complementary technological capability, excessive licensing impedes a 
licensee‘s learning. Subsequent to my research findings above, I have come across 
a very recent paper (Wang et al., 2013) that has made similar findings for H1 and 
H2 in China, for both high-tech and non-high tech manufacturing firms as well as 
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service firms, albeit over a much shorter time period (2000-2003). Despite the 
differences in sector and time coverage of this new paper, I believe it further 
validates my research findings. My above empirical findings support the resource-
based approach for determining what technology latecomers should license in, and 
help explain why some latecomers‘ innovation performance outshines others. This 
essay provides important empirical support for the recent trend of inward licensing 
as a strategy for latecomers to achieve technological catching-up. 
Based on the above findings, the age of licensed-in technology is predicted as a 
hidden factor that influences the effectiveness of learning by licensing. Due to the 
concern over the mixed results of the linear relationship between licensing-in 
experience (number of licenses in this study) and subsequent innovation 
performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Álvarez et al., 2002; Johnson, 2002; Tsai 
and Wang, 2009), this study further tests the moderating effect of the age of 
licensed-in technology on the above linear relationship. The analysis is conducted 
in line with the same set of variables in Table 2-2, and the results are shown in 
Table 2-3. Model 1 contains the same control variable as Table 2-2. The results 
from Model 2 are consistent with the existing finding of the insignificant linear 
effect of licensing-in experience (number of licenses in this study) on the 
subsequent innovation performance (Tsai and Wang, 2009). Model 3 adds the 
variable – age of licensed-in technology. Like the results from Table 2-2, Model 3 
shows the same negative relationship between the age of licensed-in technology 
and the subsequent innovation performance. Ultimately, Model 4 employs all the 
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variables and tests the interaction effect of the number of licenses and the age of 
licensed-in technology. The results from Model 4 reveal that the age of licensed-in 
technology positively moderates the relationship between the number of licenses 
and the subsequent innovation performance with a P-value of 0.071. The linear 
relationship between the number of licenses and the subsequent innovation 
performance turns out to be significantly negative (P<0.1), while the negative 
relationship between the age of licensed-in technology and the subsequent 
innovation performance remains the same (P<0.01). The finding of the significant 
moderation effect further supports the predication that the age of licensed-in 
technology is an important hidden factor that affects the effectiveness of licensing-
in experience at promoting innovation. It is found that latecomers can import a 
large number of older technologies and internalize them to generate innovation. 
This finding can be explained by two underlying reasons. First, licensing is an 
important tool used by latecomers to break an industry‘s entry barriers. The 
fundamental technologies that emerge together with an industry‘s development are 
often old and thus the patents are available in the market. These patents are 
generally filed by the pioneers in the industry who often set the dominant designs 
or industry standards. For newcomers to the industry, it is impossible to 
circumvent the technical barriers to trade their products without licensing the 
fundamental technologies. For example, the two Chinese latecomers in 
telecommunications industry who have become the industry leaders, i.e., Huawei 
and ZTE, are in the list of licensees in the dataset. The patents that Huawei and 
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ZTE licensed are mainly fundamental ones from the firm that set the industry 
standards – Quantum Telecom. The second reason explaining why latecomers can 
make use of imported old technologies to generate innovation relates to the 
business model which is about how to make use of the technology. There are 
circumstances when new technologies are not available or too expensive to be 
licensed by latecomers. It is also reasonable that latecomers choose not to compete 
directly with incumbents for technology leadership, but to enter the market first by 
licensing old technologies and gradually accumulate the technological capability. 
The old licensed-in technology itself may not contribute much to the upcoming 
innovation by latecomers; however, the business model to use the old technology 
for the development of good-enough products to meet the needs of a low-end or 
new group of customers is favourable. In this way, how advanced or new of a 
technology maybe does not matter much for latecomers trying to innovate quickly, 
because the specific innovation trajectory may enable the imported old 
technologies to become visible in the market and favoured by the certain group of 
the customers. The details of the specific innovation trajectory will be discussed in 
Essay Three. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge several caveats in this essay. First, due to 
limitations of the data sources, a cross sectional dataset rather than panel data was 
used to conduct the empirical testing. Although I added in the year dummy as a 
control variable, this may have captured the limited differences between years 
when analyzing the firm level data, rather than the firm year panel. Second, besides 
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the quantitative aspect, it would be interesting to test the qualitative aspect of the 
licensed-in technologies. However, the widely used measurement of weighted 
citation cannot be tested based on the SIPO database as there is citation data 
missing from 2004 to 2007 in the database. The missing citation data in SIPO 
precluded us from examining the more quality aspects such as the value of 
technologies in this essay. Due to the above concerns, more research along these 
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Table 2-3. Negative binomial regression  
(Dependent variable = Innovation performance) 
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N=151; STANDARD ERRORS IN BRACKET 
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                                                 CHAPTER 3. 




The fact that nearly 50% of all mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
8
 fail makes M&A 
strategies a hot topic (Kitching, 1974; Rostand, 1994; Conn et al., 2001; 
Schoenberg, 2006). A central issue raised in the M&A literature is the strategic 
choice of target firms to explain the performance variance among acquiring firms. 
The strategic choice is based on the possible interaction between the target and 
acquiring firm after M&A. This interaction is characterized by complementarity 
and substitution. When there is synergy between the two organizations, they 
cooperate well and complement each other. If not, the target firm becomes a 
possible substitute serving the function of replacement. Much of the existing M&A 
literature on this subject has focused on the synergy effect (Seth, 1990; Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Capron and Piste, 2002; King et al., 2004; Koenig and Mezick, 2004; 
Cloodt et al., 2006), whereas less attention has been paid to the possible 
substitution. 
Maximizing the synergy effect is the most widely adopted measure and is used as a 
                                                 
8
 There are two different activities embedded in the term ―M&A‖: a merger is a consolidation of 
two firms into one legal entity, whereas an acquisition is a takeover of a smaller firm by a large one 
in terms of firm value. 
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strategic selection criterion in M&A. The synergy effect posits that the integration 
of the target and acquiring firm is more effective than the two firms operating 
separately (Cording et al., 2002). It has been found that the synergy effect in M&A 
leverages not only financial synergies, such as debt capacity and financial risk 
(Lewellen, 1971; Brunner, 1988; Leland, 2007), but also operational synergies, 
such as economies of scale, resource reallocation and cost reduction (Pautler, 
2001). In line with the synergy effect, the under-performance of post-M&A 
innovation activities has been mainly attributed to the management challenges 
associated with the differences between the two firms during the integration 
process (Child et al., 1999; Schweiger and Very, 2003). Ahuja and Katila (2001) 
and Cloodt et al. (2006) examined the differences in the technology bases and 
found that an acquiring firm is not better off chooses a target firm with distant 
technologies and a large amount knowledge base. It is notable that technologically 
advanced firms can benefit from similar external resources that complement their 
existing competency. Since some technologically laggard firms, such as latecomers, 
do not possess good-enough competencies that can be complemented, they need to 
substitute many different technologies to swiftly catch up. The latecomer cases 
may invalidate the traditional view of the synergy effect based on the two critical 
measures of technology distance and relative knowledge size. This essay aims to 
uncover the contingencies where the traditional view on technology distance and 
its impact on post-M&A innovation outcomes are turned upside down.  
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Although there exists rich M&A literature in developed economies, it is 
insufficient without taking account of the new growth economies, such as China 
(Cooke, 2006). The fact of high failure rates (Kitching, 1974; Rostand, 1994; Conn 
et al., 2001; Schoenberg, 2006) has not stopped Chinese latecomers from engaging 
in M&A. To the contrary, they continue to employ M&A at ever increasing rates. 
After the economic crisis of 2003, the volume of M&A grew at a rate of 70% over 
the following five years in China (Chen and Shin, 2008). As of the first half year of 
2012, the M&A in China accounted for 38.4% of the total volume of M&A in Asia, 
which makes China the world‘s second largest M&A market after the US (Reuters, 
2012). Of all M&A participants in China, high-tech, materials and new energy 
related firms are the three main industries (Reuters, 2012). Higgins and Rodriguez 
(2006) highlighted that M&A could lead to cost reduction and solve the distress of 
outdated technological pipelines. These benefits make M&A a popular form of 
competency reconfiguration, especially for latecomers whose technological 
capability is poor and easy to elapse during technological evolution. This helps 
explain why some latecomers choose not to achieve catching-up by their own 
R&D, but rather to integrate external R&D capability through M&A. Moreover, 
the need to catch up with fast-changing technology trends may encourage 
latecomers to substitute new blood from target firms for their existing competency. 
However, whether there is any possible substitution in M&A and its effect on the 
innovation performance of an acquiring firm remain inconclusive.  
In the context of Chinese latecomers, this essay investigates the situation where 
  62 
both synergy and substitution are possibilities in M&A, as shown in the upper left-
hand quadrant Figure 3-1. Figure 3-1 clarifies the four fundamental situations 
based on the two dimensions, namely (1) technology disparity and (2) 
technological capability. According to Jaffe (1986), substitution only exists among 
related technologies, while non-related technologies do not necessarily substitute 
each other but are only acquired for diversification. To fit this situation, this study 
sampled both Chinese target and acquiring firms within the high-tech sector of 
electronic and telecommunications to avoid the situation of technological non-
relatedness. Moreover, this essay acknowledges the fact that, as latecomers, 
Chinese high-tech firms are initially resource poor and thus have relatively low 
technological capabilities, especially compared to firms from developed economies 
(Mathews, 2002). This gives an important scope to this study.  
       Figure 3-1. Situations for possible substitution in M&A 
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Chinese listed firms with a focus on the effects of technology distance and relative 
knowledge base between the target and acquiring firm. This essay views 
technology distance as a proxy for the possible strategy intention of substitution. 
Equally important, the relative knowledge base influences the success of 
substitution towards a greater innovation performance. Furthermore, the interaction 
effect between the technology distance and relative knowledge base will be 
examined in the empirical literature for the first time. By presenting new empirical 
findings, this essay contributes to the strategic management literature on M&A and 
adds to the substitution perspective of latecomers, rather than solely relying on the 
traditional view of firms in developed economies.   
 
3.2 Theory and Hypothesis 
A growing body of literature has shown interest in refining the boundaries of 
external resources for technology development. Innovations led by external 
resources beyond a firm‘s existing technology domain have a significant influence 
on technology development (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). The creation of 
innovation along a distinct technology trajectory is mainly determined by 
motivations, existing competency and external resources (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1994; Teece et al., 1997). By focusing on M&A strategies for latecomers, this 
essay investigates the motivations, qualitative and quantitative dimensions of 
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knowledge, as well as its impact on subsequent innovation performance, in the 
context of emerging economies.  
Motivation of M&A by Latecomers 
As a form of external resource importation, M&A is primarily known as an 
important gateway to facilitate market entry and growth (Hitt et al., 1996). The 
rationale for M&A can be broadly categorized as either proactive motivations or 
adaptive motivations (Burns et al., 2005). Firms may engage in M&A due to 
proactive motivations such as increasing economies of scale or bringing in new 
technologies, R&D equipment and intelligence to enhance their R&D productivity. 
Under the pressures of economic and technological changes, firms are motivated to 
acquire other firms in order to adapt to fast-changing technology trends and 
reconfigure their competency.  
To acquire or not to acquire is an important purchasing or self-making decision for 
acquiring firms. It was found M&A can help acquiring firms overcome resource 
constraints and promotes resource reintegration, thereby increasing the overall 
value of the knowledge stock by cost-cutting. According to a Centre Watch report 
(2000), acquiring firms, on average, experience a 34% reduction in R&D activities 
three years after M&A. This reduction of duplicate R&D is driven by resource 
reintegration, which implicitly assumes to substitute for the need to perform 
internal R&D. This might be a possible form of substitution, but most likely 
happen to technologically advanced firms: instead of throwing away their throwing 
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away their existing technologies, they will try to integrate the newly acquired 
technologies with their existing technologies. However, there might be another 
form of substitution in the case of acquiring firms that are latecomers with 
relatively low level of accumulated technologies: the acquiring firm may stop 
using what it has already accumulated earlier, and switch to using the new 
technologies acquired through M&A instead. Indeed, it has been found that firms 
with relatively weaker technology pipelines, like latecomers, have a higher 
probability of undertaking M&A (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). Similarly, firms 
with inferior or outdated R&D portfolios, like latecomers, tend to engage in M&A 
(Danzon et al., 2007). It is also true that it usually take years for a latecomer to 
develop its own technological capability. As an alternative, M&A may enable a 
latecomer to speed up its competency reconfiguration. Thus, it is possible that the 
acquiring firm simply replaces its existing technological assets with that of the 
target firm. It is this second meaning of substitution that I would like to focus on in 
this study.   
Technology Boundaries and Post-M&A Innovation Performance  
M&A is associated with the process of integrating the internal resources of an 
acquiring firm and the external resources from a target firm. Innovation as an 
outcome of the integration process is closely related to the technology boundaries 
of the knowledge bases (Breschi et al., 2003). As firms tend to gradually increase 
their knowledge coherence by patenting in closely related technological fields 
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(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Breschi et al., 2003), great efforts are needed if a firm 
is active in two or more technology fields. It has been pointed out that in which 
direction a firm decides to develop its technological competency depends on 
linkages between technology fields (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Breschi et al., 
2003). A firm‘s competency evolves by acquiring external resources. However, 
firms often have difficulties moving away from an existing technology track due to 
knowledge and organizational inertia. A firm‘s existing legacy leads to technology 
development along a particular path and may lock out opportunities to upgrade 
technological competency (Teece et al., 1997; Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). The 
efficiency of integration in M&A is maximized when there are no differences 
between the technology domain, cognitive range and form of thought (Nooteboom, 
2000). However, a target and an acquiring firm are never identical, and the major 
differences can result in management difficulties during the integration process as 
well as innovation outputs. Acquiring a target firm with non-distant knowledge is 
recommended because the familiar knowledge is associated with common forms of 
thought, shared cognitive ranges and similar innovation routines (Spender, 1989; 
Kogut and Zander, 1996), and the similar knowledge elements will facilitate 
technological learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). In 
contrast, integrating distant knowledge can be resource-consuming (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991; Singh and Zollo, 1997).  
The absorptive capacity theory has been widely employed in the organizational 
learning literature to explain the effectiveness of assimilating the unfamiliar 
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knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Mowery et al., 1996; Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Tsai, 2001; Zahra and George, 2002; Lane et al., 2006; Makri et al., 2010). 
On one hand, the learning capability is enhanced when acquiring familiar 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1996). 
On the other hand, interaction with unfamiliar knowledge may lead to solving old 
problems in new ways, which is termed the ―cross-fertilization effect‖ (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Ahuja and Katila (2001) suggested that 
integrating too similar knowledge could limit the benefits of organizational 
learning. Furthermore, they pointed that a moderate degree of relatedness between 
the acquired and existing knowledge benefits an acquiring firm the most by 
creating synergy in the post-M&A stage. Thus, Ahuja and Katila (2001) and 
Cloodt et al. (2006) found a curvilinear (an inverted U) relationship between the 
relatedness of the acquired knowledge and the subsequent innovation performance. 
It is worthwhile to mention that the studies by Ahuja and Katila (2001) and Cloodt 
et al. (2006) were under the context of developed economies where firms‘ 
technological capability is advanced. On average, latecomers from emerging 
economies are not so technologically advanced. This essay examines cases in 
emerging economies (i.e., China) and thus may expect to find a different function 
of using distant knowledge.  
In line with the absorptive capacity argument, a lower level of knowledge 
accumulation makes it difficult for latecomers to achieve synergy when acquiring 
distant knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 
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1996). When a latecomer acquires the non-distant knowledge, it reduces the 
integration cost of inappropriate routines and also enhances the technological 
learning that will allow it to delve deeper into a specialized domain (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967). As the technology distance becomes shorter, acquired 
knowledge is more likely to enhance the latecomers‘ exploration capability for 
continuous innovation, especially the innovation with shared technology domains. 
Thus, I propose Hypothesis 1: 
H1. Technology distance has a negative effect on the subsequent innovation 
performance of an acquiring firm. 
Quantitative Dimension of Knowledge and Post-M&A Innovation Performance 
Despite the importance of technology distance, the quantity of acquired knowledge 
remains a preliminary condition for a firm to benefit from M&A. In the pre-M&A 
stage, the accumulative existing knowledge of the acquiring firm determines its 
absorptive capacity to integrate external resources (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt 
et al., 2006). Ideally, the acquired knowledge from the target firm is added to the 
existing knowledge pool of the acquiring firm and becomes part of the integrated 
absorptive capacity after M&A (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). 
However, the transition of organizational forms during the integration process can 
be risky (Amburgey et al., 1993; Capron, 1999), since either the acquired 
knowledge or existing knowledge has been encapsulated in certain skills and 
routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). During the integration process, the acquired 
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knowledge base needs to transition and be united with the existing organizational 
forms. A large quantity of acquired knowledge usually results in a high level of 
organizational disruption due to management distrust, business model differences 
and other inherent routine differences. Even if the transition period is not long-
lasting, the subsequent benefits in terms of innovation under the newly shared 
organizational form are at risk (Kogut and Zander, 1996). This risk can be 
significant, especially when the existing knowledge base is not large enough to 
absorb the acquired one. Thus, the relative knowledge base between the size of  the 
knowledge base of a target firm and that of an acquiring firm has been identified as 
a critical integration factor influencing post-M&A innovation performance (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). Ahuja and Katila (2001) and Cloodt et al. 
(2006) have suggested a negative relationship between the relative knowledge base 
and the subsequent innovation performance of acquiring firms in developed 
economies. In comparison with developed economies, the management culture of 
emerging economies, such as power distance and uncertainty avoidance in China, 
may result in a lack of incentives in cross-organizational integrations (Hofestede 
and Bond, 1988; Pieper, 1990). This management culture, which profoundly 
influences the individual, group and organizational behaviors, may cause further 
organizational disruptions in the integration process. Thus, my theory in the 
context of emerging economies suggests the same: the integration process occurs 
fitfully when there is an overload of the acquired knowledge (as the notion of high 
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relative knowledge base), and the subsequent integration difficulties impair the 
innovation activities and potential growth.  
Needs of Integration and Post-M&A Innovation Performance 
There has been mounting concern of the ways to promote a firm‘s post-M&A 
innovation performance. The existing literature consistently supports that an 
acquiring firm should create innovation together with a target firm by capturing 
synergies, but should not to acquire an innovative firm with unfamiliar technology 
for diversification (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrel et al., 1988; Andrade et al., 
2001; Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2010). For instance, Andrade et al. (2001) and 
Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) found that undiversified firms are valued higher 
than their diversified counterparts after M&A. The above strategy is based on the 
assumption that the main strategic goal of M&A is to achieve synergy (Lewellen, 
1971; Brunner, 1988; Pautler, 2001; Leland, 2007).  This may be true in developed 
economies where firms undertake M&A for the subsequent synergy value because 
it can extend its existing competency. However, latecomers in emerging economies 
have a different reason for engaging in M&A. Due to the concern that latecomers 
are not technologically advanced, they are more likely to take root by acquiring 
unfamiliar technology from an innovative firm and using it as it is.  
However, the strategy that latecomers undertake in M&A tends to be substitution, 
not diversification. Scholars have investigated the phenomenon of the 
―diversification discount‖ where the value of a firm that pursues diversifying 
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M&A activities declines (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Lamont and Polk, 2002 and 
Villalonga, 2004). This phenomenon has been articulated since the fall of 
diversifying M&A in the 1950s (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Matsusaka, 1993; 
Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2010). The common cause of this value destroying effect 
associated with diversifying M&A is the limitation of resource exchange where 
only a small part of the existing and acquired knowledge is involved in the post-
M&A integration process. Despite the integration efforts, the indigestibility of the 
non-integrated parts, which is mostly attributed to the unfamiliar knowledge, from 
the target firms results in organizational disruption and hurts the value of the 
acquiring firm (Hennart and Reddy, 1997). It should be noted that the acquiring 
firms generally have negative abnormal returns in M&A diversification, whereas 
the target firms can have positive abnormal returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Jarrell et al., 1988; Andrade et al., 2001). Technologically laggard firms, such as 
latecomers from emerging economies, may just replace their existing competency 
with that of the target firm; therefore, integration is not necessary in the post-M&A 
stage. If there is no integration of the acquiring and target knowledge bases, I 
predict there will be substitution.   
This essay examines the requirements for integrating the two knowledge bases via 
the joint effect of the two integration factors, namely the technology distance and 
relative knowledge base. The possibility of integration decreases as the technology 
characteristics of the two knowledge bases become incompatible with each other. 
As the technology distance between the target and acquiring firm increases, the 
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acquired knowledge becomes more likely to be from outside the explorative scope 
of the existing absorptive capacity, and thus the compatibility of the two 
knowledge bases collapses. On the other hand, the practical needs of 
organizational integration are associated with the initial strategic selection during 
M&A. The cost of organizational integration depends on the size of the two 
knowledge bases: the larger the acquired knowledge base, the higher the 
integration cost, e.g., time and efforts, that the existing organization must pay to 
prevent organizational disruption. Thus, the needs of integration further decreases 
as the acquired knowledge base grows relative to the existing one (as the notion of 
relative knowledge base). To obtain the benefits of M&A, latecomers can reduce 
integration costs by eliminating the outdated technology and shifting their R&D 
focus to the emerging field. Some latecomers may choose to simply add new 
businesses and replace existing technology with the new R&D because they do not 
need to be integrated.  
Under the circumstance of non-integration, latecomers do not need to worry that 
the overload of the acquired knowledge base will impair its existing competency. 
Sevilir and Tian (2012) found evidence that acquiring the target firms with greater 
R&D intensity and knowledge accumulation significantly boosts the subsequent 
returns. That is, when acquiring distant knowledge, the sizeable knowledge base of 
the target firm helps the acquiring firm achieve better innovation in the possible 
new direction. Given that latecomers have difficulties in integrating unfamiliar 
technologies in Hypothesis 1, latecomer may opt to mitigate this need of 
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integration by resorting to acquiring the external technologies to substitute (replace) 
it own technologies instead. The success of this substitution is more likely to 
appear when the acquired distant knowledge base is relatively larger than the 
existing one, because the large relative knowledge base not only can further reduce 
the needs of integration but also help promote innovation after substitution. 
Therefore, when the relative knowledge base is getting larger and the technology 
distance is getting longer, increased innovation could result in the post-M&A stage.  
Based on the above arguments, I propose Hypothesis 2: 
H2. The relative knowledge base positively moderates the relationship between 
the technology distance and the subsequent innovation performance of an 
acquiring firm. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology  
3.3.1 Sample and Data 
The source for M&A activities was originally based on the Taiwan Economic 
Journal (TEJ) database. Sample selection started with the entire population of 
listed Chinese firms in the observation period from 2003 to 2008 in the high-tech 
sector of electronic and telecommunications, which includes the electronics, IT, 
mobile and telecommunications industries. Years prior to 2003 were excluded 
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from the sample due to the absence of M&A activities recorded in the TEJ 
database. The dataset contains the names of the acquiring and target firms, the 
merger year and the year the acquiring firm was established. After carefully 
selecting the target firms without technology disparity from the TEJ database 
(Jaffe, 1986), the initial panel sample consisted of 100 firms, 208 firm-year 
observations, and 1210 M&A deals. Next, I added the patent and firm 
heterogeneity data to the panel. Data related to the firms‘ patent information was 
obtained from the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) database and 
additional firm heterogeneity information, such as the number of employees in the 
acquiring firm, the number of R&D employees in the acquiring firm and the 
registered capital on initial public offering (IPO), was collected from annual 
reports. Finally, I processed the relevant data according to the following variable 
definition for numerical analysis.  
3.3.2 Variables  
Dependent Variable 
Innovation performance: The number of patents has been widely used as a 
measurement of innovation performance in prior empirical research (Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1994; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Hall et al., 2001). Thus, I adopt 
this variable and use patent generation as a proxy indicator of the innovation 
performance for each acquiring firm. I count the number of patents applied for by 
each licensee within one, two and three years after the M&A year. The average 
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number of patents generated by each licensee within two years after the M&A year 
is considered the dependent variable. The number of patents generated within one 
year and three years after the M&A year is used in the robustness test.  
Independent Variables 
Technology distance (TD): This variable is a knowledge-relatedness measure 
between every two patents by the target and acquiring firm. All patent applications 
in SIPO are observed for a period of three years prior to the M&A year. In line 
with Jaffe‘s (1986), Engelsman and van Raan‘s (1992) and Breshi et al.‘s (2003) 
measure of knowledge-relatedness, technology distance is computed by 
Technology distance = 1-S;  
 
where Ak is the number of patents by the acquiring firm that are classified in 
primary technological field k, Tk is the number of patents by the target firm that are 
classified in primary technological field k and n is the maximum number of 
classification codes. The classification codes are collected from the three stages of 
IPC codes of each patent that the target and acquiring firm applied for in SIPO. 
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the greater the S value, the more the target and acquiring firm co-appear in the 
same technological field. 
Moderating Variable 
Relative knowledge base (RKB): This variable is a ratio obtained by dividing the 
knowledge base of the target firm by the sum of the knowledge base of the 
acquiring firm and the prior acquired knowledge base of the target firm. The 
knowledge base of the target firm is the cumulative number of patents applied for 
by the target firm in SIPO three years prior to the M&A year. The knowledge base 
of the acquiring firm is the cumulative number of patents applied for by the 
acquiring firm in SIPO three years prior to the M&A year.  
Control Variables 
Number of M&A: Many researchers (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Ornaghi, 
2006; Danzon et al., 2007) have studied the effects of M&A on the subsequent 
R&D performance and found both negative and insignificant effects, though 
negative effects seem dominant. Thus, I control for total number of M&A deals per 
year over the observation period from 2003 to 2008.  
R&D capability: Prior research has shown that innovation performance is directly 
associated with R&D capability (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Griliches, 1998). The 
number of R&D employees, R&D expenses and knowledge stock have been 
widely adopted as measures of the R&D capability of a firm. I use the number of 
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R&D employees of each acquiring firm as recorded in the annual report as the 
control variable. In practice, there is no official record of R&D expenses in the 
annual reports of Chinese listed firms. However, I am able to count the number of 
patents applied for by the acquiring firms during the three years prior to the M&A 
year and use it as the measure of the R&D capability in the robustness test. 
Firm size: Early studies have reported that firm size influences innovation 
performance (Ettlie and Rubenstein, 1987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1996). The number of employees has been used as a measure of 
firm size in empirical studies (Atuahene-Gima, 1993). Thus, firm size is defined as 
the total number of employees recorded in the acquiring firm‘s annual report.  
Registered capital: The initial capital status is important to a firm‘s performance, 
especially to latecomers with resource constraints. I include registered capital as a 
control variable to control for the financial capital of each acquiring firm. The 
recorded registered capital is the amount of money registered with the acquiring 
firm when the IPO occurred.  
Location dummy: Schoenberg (2000), Cartwright (2005) and Phene et al. (2006) 
have shown that whether an acquisition is domestic or foreign affects the 
subsequent innovation performance. Thus, I include this location dummy in the 
control variables. If the M&A is domestic, the value is defined as 0; if the M&A is 
international, the value is defined as 1. 
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3.3.3 Methods 
This study uses a negative binomial regression analysis, which is the same as the 
method in Essay One, because the dependent variable is measured by a countable 
number of patents. In this study, the tested dataset is a firm-year panel. A Hausman 
specification test
9
 is conducted to decide whether to use a random-effects model or 
fixed-effects model (Hausman et al., 1984). As the results of the Hausman test are 
insignificant, I use a negative binomial regression analysis with a random-effects 
model. A sensitivity analysis is later carried out to test the firmness of the results. 
 
3.4 Results  
Table 3-1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of all the variables. 
The mean value and relative standard deviation of the dependent variable show 
more than a five-fold difference, which confirms the choice to use a negative 
binomial regression rather than a Poisson regression in this study. Moreover, the 
independent variables of technology distance and relative knowledge base are, for 
the most part, not highly correlated with the control variables.  
                                                 
9
 This method contrasts with the fix-effects and random-effects models and it helps choose the 
random-effects over the fix-effects model in this study for methodological reasons. The fixed-
effects model is limited to estimations of samples that have variation in the dependent variable over 
time. However, in my sample, some firms would be dropped out because they have no patents 
during the observation period. Moreover, the random-effects model has the advantage of estimating 
time-invariant dummy variables such as the location dummy.  
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 **. Correlation is significant with the P value of 0.01 (2-tailed, significant at 10%) 
 *. Correlation is significant with the P value of 0.05 (2-tailed, significant at 5%) 
 Number of observations (N) = 208.  
 
 Variables  Mean  Standard 
deviation  
   1   2  3    4   5    6   7  8 
1.  Innovation     
performance 
166.981     1158.819              1        
 2.  TD .850  .317            -.052    1       
3.  RKB  1.129     4.287  -.035 -.352**   1      
 4. Number of M&A 5.817     10.492             .349** -.307**  .082   1     
 5. R&D capability 658.111     1772.471           -.049  -.110  .069 .023   1    
 6. Firm size 2871.966     7286.195           . 653**  -.133 -.005 .251** .673**    1   
 7. Registered capital 90044.7     252922.2         .132  -.085 -.025  .042  .891** -.093   1  
 8. Location dummy .0384    .180           .343**  -.160*  .113  .344**  .080 -.017 .046 1 
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Table 3-2. Negative binomial regression  
 (Dependent variable = Innovation performance) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
       H1                H2            
 
Number of M&A 
 
 
R&D capability  
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 ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, * P<0.1(two-tailed) 
 N=208; STANDARD ERRORS IN BRACKET 
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Table 3-2 shows the results of the negative binomial analysis with the estimators of 
Log likelihood and Wald chi-square. The likelihood ratio tests for all the models 
are within three significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%, two-tailed). Model 1 shows 
the basic model with all of the control variables. Of the control variables, firm size 
and location dummy show a significant positive effect on the dependent variable of 
innovation performance while the number of M&A has an insignificant effect on 
the post-M&A innovation performance, which is consistent with prior findings 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Danzon et al., 2007). The other control variables 
also show insignificant effects.  
Model 2 includes the key independent variable of technology distance and tests its 
impact on the post-M&A innovation performance. The result from Model 2a 
shows a significant negative effect (P<0.001), thereby supporting Hypothesis 1. 
This is the primary hypothesis to determine if acquiring firms have difficulties 
integrating target firms from distant technology domains. Hypothesis 1 indicates 
that acquiring firms have the strategic intention of using substitution when a target 
firm is chosen from a distant technology domain. In Model 2b, I added the variable 
of technology distance and squared it to test the curvilinear effect. Since the result 
shown in Model 2b is not significant, I dropped the squared variable in the analysis 
of the full model.  
The M&A behavior of one of the latecomers examined in the sample – 
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UTStarcom
10
 – supports my prediction of Hypothesis 1. Since 1997, UTStarcom‘s 
fame has risen due to its seizure of the Personal Handy-phone System (PHS) in 
China. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, PHS was a low-end technology and 
UTStarcom‘s only product, and its sales made up nearly 80% of the firm‘s total 
revenue. When China‘s Ministry of Information Industry lifted its ban on the 
penetration of PHS in 2003, many competitors appeared due to the low entry 
barriers, and, as a result, the revenue of UTStarcom dropped dramatically. 
Thereafter, UTStarcom decided to find new growth to differentiate its production 
line. To do so, UTStarcom changed their R&D focus to CDMA, a high-end 
technology and compeletely different terminal solution (one of the 3G solutions) 
from PHS. Since 2003, UTStarcom has begun around 50 M&A in order to 
reconfigure their competency. For example, in the early 2003, UTStarcom spent 
US$100 million on purchasing part of CommWorks, the subsidiary of 3COM in 
China, which was a dominant CDMA supplier in China. In 2004, UTStarcom 
acquired the mobile sector from Audiovox Communications Corp. and the CDMA 
equipment supplier Syscomm under Korea‘s Hyundai Corp. at the cost of US$165 
million, as well as the firm, Telos from Canada. These targets from different 
countries supported the entire value chain of CDMA terminals, which supposedly 
would lift UTStarcom‘s business performance. However, no matter how 
UTStarcom tried to integrate CDMA terminals as their core business, it was too 
                                                 
10
 The data of UTStarcom case are collected from the following firm website and online report: 
http://www.utstar.com.cn/; Liu, H.F. and Yu, J.Y. 2010. Life and Death—UTStarcom‘s strategy 
(original title: 生死―小灵通‖—UT 斯达康之路). Modern Reading Magazine (现代阅读), 10. 
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hard to compete with other strong competitors in the cell phone market. As of 2006, 
UTStarcom has almost given up the business of CDMA terminals.  
In Model 3a, I added the moderating variable of relative knowledge base, and 
further tested the interaction between this variable and technology distance. Model 
3a employs all of the variables and presents the final analysis of this study. Though 
Model 3b tests the moderating effect of the relative knowledge base based on 
Model 2b, there are no clear results and thus it will not be further discussed. 
The result of Model 3a are consistent with the earlier studies (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Cloodt et al., 2006) which found that the relative knowledge base has a 
negative impact (P<0.05) on innovation performance. A fitting analogy to this 
phenomenon would be a lion trying to swallow an elephant, even though it lacks a 
big enough stomach. Merging with a firm that has a strong and large technological 
capacity requires extra resources to repair the disruptions, such as disruptions to 
the organizational routines (Hitt et al., 1996). These repairs may result in 
management difficulties for the newly integrated firm. Due to similar reasons, the 
cases of the mergers between TCL
11
 (a large Chinese cell phone and TV producer) 
and Alcatel (a world player in the cell phone market) as well as TCL and Thomson 
Electronics Corp. (a world player in the TV market) in 2004 both ended with huge 
                                                 
11
 The data of TCL case are collected from the following firm website, online report and academic 
paper: http://www.tcl.com/en.php/news/about/id/143.html; http://baike.baidu.com/view/5085.htm; 
Su, L.F. and Zhang, Z.L. 2007. The cross-border M&A of TCL: Only for internationalization? 
(original title: TCL 的跨国并购：为国际化而国际化？) Economics and Management (经济与管
理), 21(9): 38-43. 
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losses. However, the merger between Lenovo
12
 (a Chinese PC producer) and IBM 
PC (a world player) in 2005 was considered successful by Lenovo‘s CEO, based 
on the maintenance of their market share and stock price. It is reasonable that 
management capabilities may affect the rate of success of M&A. However, there is 
no doubt that with acquiring a larger volume of assets will also come additional 
management challenges for the integrating firm, even though the giants, such as  
Alcatel, Thomson and IBM PC, bring benefits such as brand awareness, sales 
channels and IP that aid the acquirers‘ internationalization.  
In Model 3a, Hypothesis 2 is verified by the results of the positive coefficient 
(P<0.05) between the interaction term (between technology distance and relative 
knowledge base) and the post-M&A innovation performance. The interaction plots 
based on Model 3a lends further support to my prediction, as shown in Figure 3-2. 
Figure 3-2 shows that acquisitions with a relatively small technology base (the 
minimum value of 0 in the sample) lead to a decrease in the post-M&A innovation 
performance as the technology distance between a target and an acquiring firm 
increases. This is the case for most firms as the relative technology base is 
relatively small. In contrast, acquiring targets with a relatively big technology base 
(the maximum value of 10 in the sample) leads to an improvement of the 
technological performance as the technology distance increases. This may appear 
to be at odds with arguments that found a decreasing absorptive capacity with 
                                                 
12
 The data of Lenovo case are collected from the following online reports:  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lenovo; http://industry.caijing.com.cn/2013-03-21/112610222.html 
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increasing technology distance (Nooteboom et al., 2007). However, this 
phenomenon can be explained by the fact that firms that acquire targets with strong 
technological assets at a large distance from their existing technological 
competencies do not need to integrate the two technology bases. It may be the case 
that the old technology is replaced by the technology of the target firm. A second 
characteristic of the figure is that for very small technology distance (<0.35) a 
higher relative technology base of the target firm implies a poorer innovation 
performance; at higher values of technology distance the opposite is true. This 
confirms that, when the acquired technologies are not too distant from existing 
technologies, the latecomers are likely to try to achieve synergy between the 
acquired and own technologies, but when technology distance is high, they are 
likely to switch to a substitution approach instead (i.e., positive values for high 
technological distance combined with a large relative technology base of the 
target).  
This substitution can be illustrated using an example of China‘s top management 
solution provider, namely UFIDA
13
. Their growing-up story through M&A further 
evidences the finding in Hypothesis 2. In UFIDA‘s early days (1997-1998), its 
product development focused on middleware platform and ERP software. 
However, because the middleware  platform  market was dominated  by giants like 
                                                 
13
 The data of UFIDA are collected from the following firm website and online reports: 
http://www.yonyou.com/about/index.aspx; http://business.sohu.com/50/13/article205611350.shtml; 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/s/n/2003-08 25/1140225041.shtml  
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Figure 3-2. Interaction plots  
IBM and Oracle, UFIDA decided to give up self-developing middleware platform 
and cooperate with IBM‘s Websphere platform instead. Since then, UFIDA has 
concentrated on ERP development for local enterprises where their technology 
capabilities have a good reputation and they can enjoy more localized advantages 
than foreign competitors. Thus, UFIDA acquired several domestic firms to 
facilitate specialization in ERP solutions. When UFIDA was established in 1988, 
the financial module in its existing enterprise software was the only product. 
Gradually, UFIDA added in new management modules by integrating with 
stronger counterparts. For example, in 2003, UFIDA acquired Beijing Huili IT Ltd. 
and Beijing AnYi Software Ltd., two strong players in the management software 
industry that specialize in production capital and e-commerce management 
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capital and e-commerce leveraged the market potential and helped UFIDA gain the 
majority share of the Chinese ERP software market. In 2006, UFIDA‘s market 
share even rapidly rose to 21%, completely surpassing other domestic and foreign 
players. This prominent performance shows that the above acquisitions helped 
UFIDA successfully substitute middleware platform with ERP development.  
Several robustness tests confirmed the accuracy of the results. First, the analysis of 
the full models assessed changes in the dependent variable of innovation 
performance by adjusting the period of the patent counts from one year to three 
years after M&A. Second, the number of R&D employees was replaced by the 
existing knowledge base of the acquiring firms. Third, I changed the relative 
knowledge base to the total acquired knowledge base from the target firms. The 
estimated coefficients from the above three independent tests all produced similar 
empirical results, which support both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  
 
3.5 Discussion and Summary  
This essay has investigated the substitution effect in M&A in emerging economies 
for assisting latecomers‘ competency building. Using China as the context, I 
identified how latecomers‘ strategic choices differ from the smooth acquisition 
process of related technologies and found the contingencies where the substitution 
effect can improve the post-M&A innovation performance. The striking finding is 
that when the technology distance between a target and an acquiring firm increases, 
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a greater acquired knowledge base will reverse the negative effect of technology 
distance on innovation performance. The results reveal that M&A can create a 
more flexible set of strategic choices than simply aiming for the incremental 
complements portrayed in the traditional view of the synergy effect. Overall, 
acquiring for substitution is also an important alternative strategic choice for 
acquiring firms.  
This essay has made the following empirical contributions. Although prior 
literature has investigated the impact of technology similarity and relative 
knowledge base on innovation performance, this essay is among the earliest to 
examine their interaction effect on innovation performance in the M&A literature. 
The finding of the negative effect of relative knowledge base on post-M&A 
innovation performance is consistent with earlier works (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006). However, I found a negative effect between the technology 
distance and post-M&A innovation performance in emerging economies. This 
result is not entirely surprising because the prior finding of a curvilinear 
correlation between technology similarity and innovation performance was based 
on developed economies (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). Unlike 
acquiring firms in developed economies, latecomers in emerging economies often 
lack the absorptive capacity to integrate distant knowledge from target firms. 
Furthermore, this essay proves the fact that the acquired absorptive capacity tested 
by the relative knowledge base plays an important moderating role in the 
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relationship between the technology distance and the post-M&A innovation 
performance. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the caveats in this essay. First, of all the 
situations in Figure 3-1, this study focused on the substitution effect in M&A 
among latecomers within the scope of technological relatedness in emerging 
economies. Besides well-established research in firms within the scope of 
technological relatedness in developed economies, another two situations of 
acquiring target firms with technological disparity are left for future research. 
Second, the basic argument of this study has been based on the assumption that 
acquiring firms obtain the target firms with valuable assets (as the notion of a 
―good buy‖). Because the assets of the target firms are undervalued by the market, 
the potential of a ―good buy‖ motivates the acquiring firms to undertake M&A 
(Pautler, 2001). Despite the good intention, the actual value of the assets is not 
measured in this study, because there is insufficient data to introduce a variable 
that measures the value of the sample firms. Since this study employs patent data 
as a proxy of the innovation performance, patent citations can be measured as the 
value of innovation. Unfortunately, there is missing citation data from the period 
2004-2007 in the SIPO database. This suggests the need for further research on the 
value laggards between a target and an acquiring firm, as well as the need for more 
fine-grained measures of technology bases. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
COMBINING OPEN INNOVATION AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
With the growing importance of emerging economies, disruptive innovation (DI) has 
attracted renewed attention in the literature. The DI theory has been articulated as a 
powerful means for latecomers to ―attack from below‖ and eventually overtake the 
global market by introducing simple, convenient and low cost products (Christensen, 
1997; Adner, 2002; Charitou and Markides, 2003; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Gillbert, 2003; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006; Yu and Hang, 2010). When a 
latecomer introduces a disruptive technology into the marketplace, it results in 
competition with the incumbents and can potentially make the latecomer the new 
market leader. Prior research has emphasized this aspect of head-on competition 
(Christensen, 1997). Thus, DI has been analyzed from the perspective of either the 
latecomer or the incumbent (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Utterback and Acee, 
2005; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006). The possible interaction that occurs 
between the two has not been examined and remains a gap in the DI research. 
The latecomer-incumbent cooperation does occur and this cooperation has been 
examined in other types of discontinuous technological change. For instance, 
Spedale (2003) investigated the types of cooperation that take place between 
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latecomers and incumbents in response to the introduction of a radical technology, 
specifically the application of Fibre-optics in optical communication. However, the 
results might not be applicable to disruptive technology, which is very different from 
radical technology. Recently, Hüsig and Hipp (2009) explored whether incumbents 
could integrate the potential disruptive technology – WiFi, in order to complement 
the existing product towards the development of sustaining innovation. This internal-
external resource integration strategy described as open innovation (OI) 
(Chesbrough, 2003), is known to benefit incumbents at large. However, latecomers 
who have resource constraints (Mathews, 2002) may also choose to undertake OI to 
access external resources and to cooperate with incumbents in DI development 
because incumbents usually do not pursue their own DIs owing to asymmetric 
motivation  (Christensen, 1997; Yu and Hang, 2010). 
Existing studies (Spedale, 2003; Hüsig and Hipp, 2009) have examined the 
latecomer-incumbent cooperation only in relation to the goal of sustaining 
innovation, whereas this essay will study this collaboration aiming at creating DIs. 
This present study will also go beyond the telecommunications industry to cover 
cases in a number of high-tech industries. From a latecomer‘s perspective, I raise the 
following research questions: 
(1) Whether latecomer disruptors could cooperate with incumbents (i.e., use OI) 
to commercialize DI? 
(2) If so, what are the conditions for a successful cooperation? 
  92 
The research questions are addressed through multiple case studies describing the 
experience of latecomers in China‘s high-tech industries. From these case studies, I 
have discovered that DI does not always lead to competition between latecomers and 
incumbents and that collaborative ties can be important in determining the market 
success of DI. The cases have also enabled me to analyze the favourable conditions 
under which OI can combine with DI and to explore the benefits for latecomer 
disruptors and incumbents to undertake OI. 
 
4.2 Theory Background  
4.2.1 Latecomers’ Disruptive Innovation Path 
To achieve catching-up, latecomers frequently adopt DI into their business models 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Wu et al., 2010) to establish a market foothold with 
a new disruptive technology. The disruptive product or service disrupts the market 
by attacking the over-served market from the low-end or by stimulating a need that 
expands the market (Christensen, 1997; Utterback and Acee, 2005). The disruptive 
technology is typically inferior on many attributes compared to products in the 
mainstream market, but makes up for this deficit with features that are attractive to 
the low-end or a new market (Christensen, 1997). As there are usually many 
latecomers competing in the same market segment, this essay clearly distinguishes 
the two stages in the DI path (as shown in Figure 4-1): the foothold stage when the 
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latecomer initially enters the market; the competitive stage when the latecomer 
competes with other disruptors. A vast portion of the DI literature elaborates the 
foothold stage with respect to how latecomers gain a foothold in a market, and pays 
less attention to the competitive stage which has been widely implied but not 
explicitly emphasized (Christensen, 1997; Rafii and Kampas, 2002; Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 2004; Keller and Hüsig, 2009). For a DI to be 
successful, the technology on which it is based should improve continuously 
throughout the competitive stage. Latecomers are often challenged by two types of 
firms, fast disruptive followers and incumbents. Competition with fast disruptive 
followers usually occurs early in the competitive stage, while competition with 
incumbents usually occurs later once the disruptive technology has threatened the 
incumbents‘ established business. An incumbent‘s position may be disrupted, if the 
performance of the latecomer‘s product or service reaches a level acceptable to the 
mainstream market after traversing the entire DI path. 
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4.2.2 Latecomers’ Perspective of Cooperation  
One of the main challenges for latecomers is shortage of technology (Mathews, 2002, 
2006). To compensate, they may cooperate with incumbents to tap into advanced 
technologies and bypass steps in the technology trajectory in order to catch up 
quickly (Lee and Lim, 2001). The strategic goal of latecomers is to raise their 
position towards market leadership by swift innovation (Lim, 1997; Mathews, 2002). 
Latecomers have a competitive advantage in exploiting emerging opportunities and 
responding to relevant technologies compared to incumbents who are often locked 
into existing business and sustaining innovation (Christensen, 2006; Henderson, 
2006). However, latecomers rarely have the ownership advantages enjoyed by 
incumbents that are needed to develop technology and leverage the 
commercialization. By cooperating with incumbents, latecomers may pursue 
their goal of catching-up and eventually rising to the top of the market. Therefore, it 
is critical for latecomers to cooperate strategically with incumbents to complement 
their missing resources.  
Building on Teece‘s (1986) framework regarding the two key drivers that affect the 
cooperation strategies and outcomes of innovators – complementary assets and 
appropriability regime – this study tries to understand whether latecomers can 
cooperate with incumbents in commercializing DI and raise their market position. 
Complementary assets such as distribution networks, service capabilities, 
complementary technologies, brands and competitive manufacturing are necessary 
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in commercializing a technology (Teece, 1986; Gans and Stern, 2003). The existing 
players in the market always leverage their pre-emption rights of those 
complementary assets (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). If complementary assets 
are owned by a competitor or a third party, it is critical for latecomers to obtain them 
through cooperation so that they can rapidly commercialize their innovation. For 
instance, having been the world‘s manufacturers for many years, some Chinese 
latecomers have accumulated the necessary capacity in the downstream of value 
chain to appropriate value from innovations in the local market. However, unlike the 
incumbents, they generally do not have other complementary assets, especially the 
brand, distribution channels and complementary technologies. Cooperation with 
incumbents may, under particular circumstances, be the easiest route for latecomers 
to obtain the missing complementary assets, so that they can rapidly grow and 
capture the local market. Though this can be difficult in the same market segment, it 
may be attractive to incumbents in a new market, especially given the large 
population of potential customers in China. 
Appropriability regime is the other important driver that has been identified to shape 
cooperation between latecomers and incumbents, especially in high-tech industries 
(Teece, 1986; Gans and Stern, 2003). Appropriability regime refers to an 
environment that allows markets for technology to coalesce and function efficiently 
(Teece, 1986). In the context of a sole country such as China, firms share the similar 
state of democracy and economic environment that determine the degree of 
appropriability regime (Liu, 2005). Looking into the functional content, 
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appropriability regime has been regarded as a function of the legal intellectual 
property rights regime (Orozco, 2007). Intellectual property (IP) is an exclusive right 
for the creator of IP to capture value over the use of an invention or technology 
(Wagner, 2003). IP is protected primarily to stimulate the transfer of technology in 
the form of licensing, joint venture and foreign direct investment (Gould and Gruben, 
1996). This involves technology markets where IP rights and contracts are well 
defined, litigation is predictable and damages can be assessed. In addition, 
appropriability regime is also a function of the degree to which the technology 
behind the innovation is tacit, i.e., the degree to which it is imitable (Orozco, 2007). 
Teece (1986) demonstrated that tacit or poorly codified knowledge is harder to 
transmit and harder to appropriate. Because the ownership of technology is a major 
incentive for cooperation between firms, this study mainly concentrates on the 
transferable part of the appropriability regime, namely IP.  
In the field of discontinuous technological change, early contributions by Spedale 
(2003) gave evidence for the existence of cooperation strategies for both new 
entrants (as the notion of latecomer in this context) and incumbents at times of 
radical technology. Spedale (2003) found that incumbents tend to undertake 
structured cooperation (at inter-organizational level) with the latecomer for the new 
technology and apply the technology to their traditional market (market-pull 
strategy). Whereas, the unstructured cooperation (at individual level) is likely to 
appear in the specialist niches where latecomer with new technology tends to 
concentrate (technology push). As the other type of the discontinuous technology, 
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disruptive technology has also been found to have an enhancing effect on the 
existing sustaining innovation for incumbents who cooperates it (Hüsig and Hipp, 
2009). However, little research has been done on cooperation for developing DI, 
especially from latecomers‘ perspective. Since the latecomer characteristics 
discussed above may be applicable to DI, the dynamics underlying this cooperation 
between latecomer disruptors and incumbents will be discussed in the next sub-
section. 
4.2.3 Dynamics between Latecomers and Incumbents in Disruptive Innovation 
Earlier studies have investigated how latecomers‘ DI may cause incumbents to lose 
their dominant position (Christensen, 1997, 2006; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Henderson, 2006; Wu et al., 2010; Yu and Hang, 2010). Christensen (1997) found 
that incumbents have a hard time sensing or appreciating DI opportunities and 
therefore tend to ignore them. Limited by their organizational routines and sole focus 
on existing customers, incumbents may miss new market trends and make wrong 
decisions about future directions. The incumbents are preoccupied with competitors 
in sustaining innovation and usually do not pay enough attention to the disruptive 
power especially in the low-end market. This ignorance gives latecomers an 
opportunity to start and grow. Thus, DI creates avenues for latecomers to enter from 
the low-end or create a new niche market. Incumbents are rarely motivated to pursue 
DI because their existing customers are not interested in the initially inferior DI 
products and the DI market is often associated with a small group of under-served 
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customers who are not seen as particularly profitable. However, Christensen (1997) 
found that the disruptive technology will improve over time and its performance 
may eventually be improved to a level suitable for the mainstream market. By 
competing from an unexpected direction, latecomers may gradually catch up with 
and out-compete incumbents who only monitor competitors in the sustaining 
direction in the existing market (Afuah and Utterback, 1991; Christensen, 1997). 
Although incumbents often miss DI opportunities, this does not imply that 
latecomers may take it for granted that their DI efforts will be successful. If 
latecomers can develop their own disruptive technology and successfully 
commercialize it, they could capture the overlooked market. However, if latecomers 
simply have disruptive ideas based on more recent knowledge, without the ability to 
quickly realize them, they may attempt to cooperate with incumbents in order to gain 
access to their complementary resources, e.g., manufacturing technology, 
distribution channels, etc. In the same situation, a small entrant firm may have 
capability to gain a foothold in disruptive innovation, but insufficient resources to 
compete and grow rapidly; it will then be a need for tapping the resources of 
incumbents if a win-win arrangement could be made. For incumbents, this type of 
cooperation with latecomers is only worthwhile if they can expect value in return in 
the form of disruptive ideas, licensing fees, etc. (Narula, 2006). As key drivers, 
complementary assets and IP may significantly affect potential cooperation between 
latecomer disruptors and incumbents (Gans et al., 2002; Gans and Stern, 2003; He  
et al., 2006). Moreover, the importance of these drivers varies with the market 
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segments. In an existing market where complementary assets and IP are mainly 
controlled by incumbents, the traditional DI path is to create a foothold at the low-
end using the existing technology. Thus, for cooperation to occur the latecomers 
must be able to offer incumbents new ideas. In a new market where both 
complementary assets and IP are underdeveloped, cooperation between latecomers 
and incumbents is mutually beneficial because it will accelerate the 
commercialization of DI and create a bigger threat to other competitors.  
Cooperation to share complementary assets and IP can be achieved by different OI 
strategies including joint ventures, alliances, corporate venture capital, acquisitions, 
outsourcing deals, licensing agreements, and spin-offs (Shenkar and Li, 1999; 
Chesbrough et al., 2006; Van de Vrande et al., 2009a, b). OI can offer latecomers a 
channel to directly contract complementary assets and IP in order to commercialize 
their potentially disruptive ideas. Alternatively, latecomers can indirectly access 
complementary assets and IP by allying with their owners. Instead of treating 
latecomers as threats, incumbents are increasingly interested in sourcing interesting 
ideas from latecomers or even investing in them. Consequently, OI may create a 
win-win situation where both latecomers and incumbents are better off than in a 
competitive DI scenario.  
To further explore how OI and DI could interact, I examine Chinese latecomers who 
launched successful DI technologies. These case studies are described in the 
following section. 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Research Strategy 
Case study has been recognized as a useful research strategy for creating theoretical 
constructs, propositions and midrange theories based on real events (Eisenhardt  and 
Graebner, 2007). In general, research based on multiple case studies is considered 
more robust than research based on a single case study (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). This essay uses multiple case studies to offer a broader perspective on 
China‘s high-tech industries. The process of theory building through case studies is 
divided into two major stages (Carlile and Christensen, 2005): a descriptive stage 
and a normative stage. The former recognizes important attributes through careful 
observation and correlates them with patterns to address the research interest. The 
latter refines the theory built during the descriptive stage through detailed empirical 
and ethnographic observation. For the purpose of this essay, I used the descriptive 
stage over multiple case studies.  
To conduct the descriptive stage, I followed a sequence of three steps: design-
observation, categorization and association.  
First step: I selected the technology that has been proven to be successful DIs in the 
mainstream market to serve as the source of case studies. The unit of case studied is 
per disruptive innovation. As a collective pool of raw data, the cases were carefully 
filtered based on Govindarajan and Kopalle‘s (2005) five criteria for DI: (1) inferior 
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on the attributes that mainstream customers value; (2) offering new features relative 
to existing products; (3) sold at a lower price; (4) attractive to a low-end, price 
sensitive or new market segment; (5) improvements to potentially attract mainstream 
customers. Since DI theory has only been extant over the past decade, not many 
empirical examples have been thoroughly studied or documented. Finally, I was able 
to identify six DI cases that meet the above criteria, and provide sufficient data 
support, derived from five Chinese latecomers. The six cases
14
 based on the DI 
criteria are summarized in Table 4-1 and the details are presented in the following 
section. 
Second Step: I analyzed the cases by examining OI practices in terms of different 
mechanisms such as licensing, M&A as well as other contractual modes, for each DI. 
Then I classified the latecomers according to cooperation, complementary assets and 
IP. The details are presented in Section 4.4.1. 
Third Step: I used this evidence to articulate the conditions for combining DI and OI. 
Based on observations from the cases, I further provided the ways for both 
                                                 
14 Among the six cases, the data of the three cases by the two Chinese disruptors, namely, e-bike 
case by LuYuan, mini magic child washer case and wine cellar case by Haier, were collected from 
interviews. The interviews were conducted face to face during the on-site visits to the firms. The 
interviewees of the e-bike case were the founders and top managers in LuYuan headquarters, 
Zhejiang, China. The interviewees of the mini magic child washer case and wine cellar case were 
the team leaders of the R&D center in Haier headquarters, Qingdao, China.  
Due to the limitation of the linkages to the rest three Chinese disruptors, I was not able to conduct 
interviews with them. Thus, the three cases, namely Galanz microwave oven, CIMC stainless steel 
refrigerated container and UFIDA U9, were mainly based on the second-hand but reliable data, 
including firm websites, academic papers, books and online reports. The details of the data sources 
are indicated in the footnote of the three cases respectively. 
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latecomers and incumbents to benefit from using OI in the context of DI. The details 
are presented in Section 4.4.2. 
 







DI features Market segmentation 
1 ―Mini Magical 
Child‖ washer 
Large cubage (5kg) 
washer at a high price 
 
Smaller (1.5kg), 
electricity and space 
saving, and pricing low  
Targeting the non-
consumption summer 
market in China – new 
market disruption 
2 Wine cellar  Niche premium 
product sold at a high 




Growing form niche 
market to mainstream  
– new market disruption 
3 Microwave 
oven 
Big size and 
expensive model 
mainly populated in 
developed countries  
Smaller size and 
cheaper 
Localizing the existing 
product and meeting the 
needs of the emerging 
middle class in China  




–pollution, hard to 
operate, expensive 
Environmental friendly, 
lighter, easy to park and 
cheaper 
Seizing the opportunity of 
two-wheeler‘s revolution 
driven by Chinese 
government (to restrict 
motorbikes in major 
cities)  
– new market disruption 





– expensive, light 
weight, advanced 
foaming technology 
Cheaper (lower cost by 
reengineering the 
manufacturing process 
and improving the 
efficiently) 
Using an existing inferior 
technology to enter a 
market and continuously 
improving  price-
performance of products 
to disrupt the dominator 
(the Japanese giant)  
– low-end disruption 
6 U9 (an 
software 
platform) 
A platform with a 
whole suite of fixed 
applications  




(based on service 
oriented architecture), 
shorter delivery time, 
cheaper and real time 
communication 
Using a new technology 
to enter a market and 
attack from the low-end to 
gain a share from existing 
players (SAP, Oracle) in 
China  
– low-end disruption 
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4.3.2 Disruptive Innovation Cases by Chinese Latecomers 
In this section, six DI cases from China are presented. The cases are drawn from a 
broad range of high-tech areas including consumer electronics, refrigerated 
containers, IT and transportation. 
4.3.2.1   Haier: Success with the Non-Consuming Market  
Haier created a successful DI example by designing a mini washing machine for 
China‘s huge untapped market. In the early 1990s, Haier started to manufacture 
conventional washing machines to meet Chinese consumption needs. At one point, 
the interesting phenomenon that washing machine sales severely dropped every 
summer drew the attention of Haier‘s top management. After analyzing the market, 
Haier found that (1) the Chinese family size was shrinking due to the one-child 
policy and (2) the market was mainly dominated by the 5 kg cubage washing 
machine. People wanted smaller washing machines, but they were not available. 
Thus, Haier identified the demand for the mini washing machine.  
In 1995, Haier designed a washing machine suitable for daily use called the ―mini 
magical child‖ with 1.5 kg cubage, low noise and high efficiency. The mini model 
saved water, electricity and space, and was sold at a lower price. In the first year, its 
sales volume achieved 30,000 units and the next year it hit one million units. Haier 
continued to improve the functions and developed twelve generations of ―mini 
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magical child‖ products in two years. Patents were also filed worldwide to protect 
this innovation. 
4.3.2.2   Haier America: The Leader in Niche Markets 
In 1995, Haier started to sell its refrigerators in the US. To support global R&D 
activities, the Haier Research Institute was established in 1996 and allied with 28 
incumbents from US, Japan, Germany, etc. Haier America was founded in 1999 as a 
joint venture between Haier and Welbilt Appliances Inc., an established American 
home appliance distributor. To support Haier America, Haier invested in its own 
factory located in South Carolina. Hoping to extend its DI success story in the US 
market, Haier America recruited local employees to identify local needs and relied 
on their partners to distribute the products. With the help of Welbilt Appliances, a 
large distribution network was established between Haier America and BestBuy, 
Wal-Mart, Sears, Lowe‘s, Home Depot and Target.    
Haier America‘s first successful DI product – a wine cellar – had previously been 
considered a premium product for a niche market. However, as a serial disruptor, 
Haier saw the growth potential of this niche market. Haier America‘s wine cellar 
was designed without an agitator that made it 40% cheaper than the existing 
Whirlpool model. The good-enough features coupled with a much lower price 
stimulated the growth of this niche market all over the world. Just two years later, 
Haier had captured 60% of the market in the US. Eventually, Haier has around 60% 
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of the global market share for wine cellars and its reputation has helped open up the 
US market for other Haier white goods. 
4.3.2.3   Galanz15: New Designs for Emerging Markets 
In the early 1990s, microwave ovens were popular in the mass markets of developed 
countries. However, due to their high price and large size, only 2% of Chinese 
families owned one. The annual market capacity in China was estimated to be 
around 20,000 units and was mainly dominated by foreign incumbents. Despite a 
technology shortage and inexperience in the consumer electronics industry, Galanz 
decided to enter the microwave oven market and designed its products for the 
emerging middle class. Galanz built its R&D team by seconding five senior 
engineers from Shanghai FeiYue, one of four microwave oven manufacturers in 
China, and imported the production line from Toshiba. In 1993, Galanz introduced 
its own small, energy-efficient microwave oven at an affordable price and quickly 
captured 10% of the market share in China. Since then, Galanz has unlocked the 
latent mass market in China and achieved annual sales of over 25 million units in 
2007. 
After establishing itself in China, Galanz pursued an original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) role in the global value chain. Rather than competing in the 
international microwave oven market directly, Galanz expanded its production scale 
                                                 
15
 The data of Galanz microwave oven case were collected from the following firm website and 
online report: http://www.galanz.com/about.shtml; Hang, C.C., Chen, J. and Subramian, A.M. 2010. 
Developing Disruptive Products from Emerging Economies: Lessons from Asian Cases. 
http://www.eng.nus.edu.sg/etm/research/publications/30.pdf 
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and cooperated with foreign incumbents. To disrupt the mainstream market in 
developed countries, Galanz continued its R&D efforts to master the key 
technologies for manufacturing microwave ovens and improved their performance to 
the satisfaction level of high-end markets. As Galanz‘s manufacturing capabilities 
continuously improved, more and more overseas incumbents moved their production 
lines to Galanz. This helped Galanz develop its own core competency as an OEM. 
By 2008, Galanz had applied for 508 patents and some of them, such as light-wave 
microwave ovens, have become the new industry standard. From its humble 
beginning in China, Galanz has become an internationally acclaimed brand and the 
world leader in microwave oven sales since 1998.  
4.3.2.4   The Zhejiang E-bike Community: A Two-wheeler Revolution 
First appearing in the late 1990s, two-wheeler electric vehicles (e-bikes) have 
become well known as a unique Chinese DI. After the Chinese government 
restricted motorcycles in major cities in the early to mid-2000s, the large scale 
commercialization of e-bikes took off. The design of the e-bike was based on the 
manual bicycle with the simple additions of a hub motor at either the front or the rear 
wheel, a battery at the back seat and a simple electronic controller mounted on the 
handlebars. The attractive characteristics of e-bikes compared to motorcycles, such 
as their small size, light weight, lower pollution and lower price, created a new trend 
in public transportation. E-bikes especially met the needs of people in cities who 
required a basic means of transport that is relatively fast, easy to operate and 
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convenient to park. Annual sales of e-bikes grew explosively from the initial 60,000 
vehicles in 1998 to over 21 million in 2008. At present, China accounts for more 
than 90% of global e-bike sales and has become the world‘s largest producer, 
consumer and exporter of e-bikes.  
The e-bike‘s success did not result from a single firm but from a community of 
affiliated firms. The three largest e-bike communities are clustered in three Chinese 
localities, namely Zhejiang, Tianjin and Jiangsu. These communities cooperated to 
obtain government support for e-bikes and the Zhejiang government began offering 
e-bike licenses in 1998. The legitimization of e-bikes triggered the boom of the e-
bike business with production growing exponentially from 50,000 in 1998 to 4 
million in 2009 in Zhejiang alone. Further using Zhejiang as an example, I illustrate 
how the development of the e-bike industry can be attributed to the highly 
modularized industry structure. This organized structure allows manufacturers to 
cooperate with modular suppliers to obtain the main e-bike components, including 
the battery, motor and frame. For example, TianNeng Electronic Co. Ltd and 
ChaoWei Power Co. Ltd. in Zhejiang currently supply about 90% of all e-bike 
batteries. XinDaYang Group Co. Ltd, a Zhejiang motorcycle firm specializing in 
motor development, invented the brushless motor widely adopted for use in e-bikes. 
The frames of e-bikes are not much different from traditional bicycles and so can be 
sourced from any bicycle frame manufacturer. Zhejiang LuYuan Electric Vehicle Co. 
Ltd. was established in 1997 and became a pioneer e-bike manufacturer. During the 
early days, in partnership with several other manufacturers, LuYuan established the 
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parameters for outsourcing e-bike components. Although the gross margin of 
manufacturing one e-bike was only about 100 or 200 Chinese Yuan, close 
cooperation within the value chain allowed e-bike firms to maintain their low cost 
advantage and shorten the whole production cycle time. This grassroots level 
innovation coupled with low costs and swift response to customer demands has 
made e-bike manufacturers a formidable threat to the motorcycle firms. Some 
famous Chinese motorcycle firms, including the Geely Group and Zhejiang 
QianJiang Motorcycle Co. Ltd., tried to produce their own e-bikes, but ultimately 
gave up. Even some e-bike firms could not survive the furious price-performance 
competition. While the number of e-bike firms in Zhejiang peaked at 330, only 
about 200 firms currently remain. One of these survivors is LuYuan.  
In late 1998, LuYuan suffered a large-scale battery crisis due to quality issues. 
Worse yet, the battery supplier refused to accept the returns or solve the problem. 
Though LuYuan took the responsibility to accept the returns, thousands of broken 
batteries threatened its reputation and caused great financial loss. After the crisis, 
LuYuan realized the importance of advanced technology and manufacturing 
capacity to guarantee the quality of e-bike batteries. LuYuan invested heavily in its 
own R&D and developed its own battery related IP. To eliminate the possibility of 
another battery crisis, LuYuan now has its own battery factory and battery brand. As 
evidence of its continuous efforts to innovate, every year LuYuan files for about ten 
patents and every month LuYuan introduces about five new models of e-bikes. With 
accumulated capital and technology, LuYuan has gradually integrated the core 
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components into its manufacturing system. Over the last ten years, LuYuan has built 
its competitiveness by controlling product cost, quality and performance.  
4.3.2.5   CIMC16: Giving Big Opportunities to Spin-offs  
Since the early 1990s, CIMC (China International Marine Containers Group) has 
been the world‘s largest manufacturer of low-tech dry-cargo containers. To diversify 
their production line, CIMC entered the refrigerated container market in 1995 with 
the hope of competing with the Japanese incumbent in this high-tech segment. There 
were two product streams in the refrigerated container market: aluminum containers 
based on full foaming technology and stainless steel containers based on 
sandwich foaming technology. The foaming technologies used by these two 
products were totally different. Sandwich foaming technology was relatively inferior 
to full foaming technology in terms of the quality of foams. Even if the quality of 
foams can be improved, the costs were found to be very much the same. This is why 
the choice of application in which metal mostly depends on costs. The aluminum 
containers were light-weight, while the stainless steel containers were heavy and 
relatively expensive. At the time, aluminum containers based on full foaming 
technology, namely aluminum refrigerated containers, were mainstream and the 
                                                 
16
 The data of CIMC Stainless steel refrigerated container case were collected from the following 
firm website, book and online reports: http://www.cimc.com/about/company/management/; 
http://atandsonline.com/articles/press-releases/steel-cargo-containers-vs-aluminum-shipping-
containers/; Joerss,  M. and Zhang, H. 2008. A Pioneer in Chinese Globalization: An Interview with 
CIMC‘s President.  http://www.mckinseychina.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/cimc08.pdf   
Banhart, J. and Seeliger. H.W. 2012. Trends in aluminum foam sandwich technology. Advanced 
Engineering Materials. Special Issue: Highly Porous Metals and Ceramics, 14(2): 1082-1087. 
Zeng, M. 2007. Dragons at Your Door: How Chinese Cost Innovation Is Disrupting Global 
Competition. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
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Japanese incumbents dominated 95% of the market share. To enter the market, 
CIMC started a spin-off called Shanghai CIMC Reefer Container Co., Ltd. (SCRC) 
and licensed sandwich foaming technology from Graaff Transport System GmbH, a 
German incumbent with a minority share of the market. Due to the high technology 
barrier, CIMC also established a joint venture with Graaff, giving Graaff a 2% share 
of SCRC and hiring its technological experts to lead R&D.  
CIMC rapidly absorbed Graaff‘s technology and increased its production efficiency. 
When the production line was originally transferred from Graaff, the manufacturing 
time was twenty minutes per container. CIMC reduced it to ten minutes per 
container in 2002, then to five minutes per container in 2004. This increased 
efficiency was achieved through process reengineering and also lowered production 
costs. To improve thermal insulation, CIMC creatively applied automobile 
technology to their refrigerated container development and improved the technology 
originally licensed from Graaff.  
In less than eight years, CIMC replaced the market standard with its more affordable 
stainless steel refrigerated containers. In 2003, CIMC captured 44% of the global 
market share and became the world‘s leading supplier of refrigerated containers. 
That same year, the Japanese incumbents pulled out of the refrigerated container 
market as their aluminum products could not compete with CIMC‘s performance 
and price. In 2005, CIMC bought 77 patents from Graaff and has since owned the 
whole series of patents related to stainless steel refrigerated containers. 
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4.3.2.6   UFIDA17: Slow and Steady Wins the Race 
Founded in 1988, UFIDA Software Company has grown to be the largest vendor of 
software with enterprise applications in China. UFIDA has dominated the low-end 
small and medium enterprises (SME) market since the early 2000s. UFIDA then 
started to gain some market share from the leading high-end global vendors, such as 
SAP and Oracle. UFIDA‘s strategy has been to seize the DI opportunity created by 
maturing Chinese enterprises that require management applications to increase their 
productivity. As a consequence, UFIDA has changed its strategic focus to operation 
expansion so it can maintain its leadership position in China. Since 2003, UFIDA 
has invested in R&D on service oriented architecture (SOA). In 2007, UFIDA 
formed a ―SOA creative centre‖ with IBM, the number one player in the SOA 
industry. SOA is an IT architectural platform used to turn business applications into 
functions and processes customized for individual businesses. UFIDA creatively 
implemented SOA in enterprise application development and in 2008 introduced 
―U9‖, the world‘s first enterprise application based on the SOA platform.  
Unlike the conventional service provider oriented model, UFIDA‘s U9 is a DI based 
on a client oriented model. Using enterprise resource planning (ERP) as an example, 
the conventional product is a platform with a whole suite of fixed applications. The 
delivery time for a SME version is around three to six months, while a large 
                                                 
17
 The data of UFIDA U9 case were collected from the following firm website and online reports: 
http://www.yonyou.com/about/index.aspx;http://oracle.sys-con.com/node/355113; Goldman Sachs, 
2010. Global Software and Services: China emerging, more of an IT services force for now. 
http://www.kingdee.com/pub/139208306/2010/files/20100822-Goldman%20Sachs-
Global%20Technology%20Software.pdf; http://www.yunnao.com/shownews.aspx?newsid=326  
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enterprise version usually needs more than one year to complete. Moreover, the 
vendor has to adjust the system for each client after implementation, which has a 
very high cost. Thus, leading global vendors such as SAP and Oracle target the high-
end market in order to increase their margins. However, by using SOA, U9 loosely 
couples the distributed applications based on the individual client‘s needs. As a 
result, U9 costs about 40% less than equivalent enterprise applications by the leading 
global vendors. To accommodate growing Chinese enterprises with diverse needs 
and management styles, UFIDA localized the design and implementation and also 
introduced new features like real time reaction and global operations for medium 
and large enterprises. By offering flexible solutions at a competitive price, U9 
appealed to clients unable to afford the traditional high-end applications. While SAP 
and Oracle are still popular among the highest ranking enterprises, U9 has been 
rapidly adopted by Chinese enterprises with relatively low level but customized 
requirements in the high-end ERP market. 
Within just twelve months of its launch, UFIDA‘s U 9 entered five new markets and 
client numbers and sales increased by 5%. UFIDA captured 49.2% of the Chinese 
high-end market by the end of 2008 and became an appealing alternative to 
incumbents like SAP and Oracle. U9‘s share of the high-end market has rapidly 
increased over the past few years and, considering the ever-rising demands of 
Chinese enterprises, still has room to grow. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The six cases described in the previous section give evidences that latecomer 
disruptors and incumbents might openly cooperate to commercialize DI. The details 
of the interactions between those firms are summarized in Table 4-2. In this section, 
I discuss the conditions for combining OI and DI as well as the propositions for both 
latecomers and incumbents to undertake OI when commercializing DI. 
4.4.1 Conditions for Combining Open Innovation and Disruptive Innovation 
When dealing with their inadequate resources, latecomers may find it is too late to 
create their own. As a result, latecomers will be keen to pursue external resources 
such as complementary assets and IP. Based on ownership of complementary assets, 
latecomers can be divided into two categories: those with and those without 
complementary assets. Latecomers with complementary assets are usually de alio 
entrants who have accumulated complementary assets from other markets and are 
able to deploy them in the target market. Latecomers without complementary assets 
are either de novo entrants (start-ups) or de alio entrants whose complementary 
assets from other markets are not applicable to the target market. Alternatively, 
based on IP ownership, latecomers can be divided into two categories: those with IP 
and those without IP. Some latecomers have their own disruptive technologies and 
the associated IP. This exclusive ownership creates entry barriers for potential 
competitors  and  builds  the  latecomers‘  competitive advantage in the market. 
Since  DI  usually  does  not  require  ground-breaking  technologies (Hobday, 1995),  
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latecomers with appropriate ideas but without IP can introduce DI by importing 
available technology from incumbents who have greater bargaining power in 
technology markets. 
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As cooperation depends on ownership of complementary assets and IP, I examine 
these together. Figure 4-2 summarizes these conditions and analyzes when OI has 
been introduced in the DI sample cases. Each DI case is considered as one unit of 
analysis. In Figure 4-2, the upper quadrants show the presence of OI and OI strategy 
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Figure 4-2. Conditions for combining open innovation and disruptive innovation 
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assets created in other markets (He et al., 2006). These applicable complementary 
assets enable the latecomer to gain some time to develop or utilize its IP for DI 
development. By using this IP, the latecomer secures the competitive advantage to 
commercialize the DI. The success of Haier‘s ―mini magical child‖ is a good 
evidence to support the above proposition. Before starting DI, Haier had 
accumulated manufacturing experience in consumer electronics. The complementary 
technologies, manufacturing capability, distribution channels, brand and supplier 
relationships had been established during the development of their prior 
conventional washing machine. Thus, Haier was self-reliant with regard to 
technology and made rapid inroads into a new market disruption. To expand the 
―mini magical child‖ product line, Haier further developed its IP and designed 
various versions based on the initial model to secure a dominant position in the mini 
washing machine market. The case illustrates that OI is not necessary for successful 
DI when latecomers own complementary assets and IP. 
In cases where latecomers lack complementary assets and IP in the target market, 
latecomers may start by using OI practices in developing and introducing a DI into 
the market. However, this is only possible in cases such as Galanz and LuYuan 
where latecomers are able to later develop their own complementary assets or IP. 
Though OI can lower the entry barriers and allow latecomers to gain a foothold, if 
they do not eventually develop these resources, latecomers will struggle to survive in 
the competitive stage. Galanz was a textile OEM before entering the microwave 
oven market, but this experience did not provide the firm with any complementary 
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assets applicable to the consumer electronics industry. By using OI to access outside 
experts and import Toshiba‘s production line, Galanz gained an immediate foothold 
and eventually unlocked the potentially huge, emerging Chinese market. To become 
a global player, Galanz cooperated with foreign incumbents and established itself as 
an OEM after many years of OI. Though it entered the market without 
complementary assets and IP, Galanz has become the world‘s largest microwave 
oven manufacturer and controls key manufacturing and IP. Similarly, LuYuan 
successfully entered the e-bike industry without complementary assets and IP. In a 
highly modularized industry such as e-bikes, manufacturing efficiency was most 
important. Thus, lack of IP was a minor disadvantage to LuYuan, a de novo 
latecomer, which used OI to work with component suppliers to establish a foothold. 
The e-bike‘s modularized design made cooperation with suppliers easy and lowered 
the entry barriers. But the benefits of OI always come with risks and LuYuan 
experienced problems with its battery supplier. Once it became important to have a 
competitive advantage through better batteries, LuYuan invested in its own battery 
factory and created related IP. The success of Galanz‘s microwave oven and 
LuYuan‘s e-bike gives evidence that OI is critical during the foothold stage for 
latecomer disruptors without complementary assets and IP. It also shows that the 
further development of competitive advantage through complementary assets and IP 
is necessary in the competitive stage. 
In cases where latecomers have IP but not the required complementary assets, 
latecomers can achieve DI by using OI strategies. De alio latecomers with IP may 
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face organizational inertia when repeating DI success, but OI can help these firms 
become serial disruptors. After the miracle of the ―mini magical child‖ in China, the 
joint venture Haier America and local factory was created to serve US niche markets. 
When Haier made its entry into the US, this was without complementary assets such 
as brand and distribution channel. However, its wine cellar, a DI case based on 
existing technology, opened up a niche market. The success of this DI was only 
possible through cooperation with US incumbent Welbilt Appliances which 
developed the Haier brand and built alliances with major retailers like BestBuy, 
Sears, Target, etc. for distribution. This cooperation between one latecomer (Haier 
America) and multiple incumbents was a win-win situation for all partners involved. 
Supported by the Haier Research Institute in China, Haier America diversified its 
product line during the competitive stage. Haier America has since enjoyed a good 
reputation and has the majority of the market share for compact fridges worldwide. 
This case illustrates how OI can help a latecomer without complementary assets to 
exploit a DI opportunity.  
In cases where latecomers have applicable complementary assets but without IP in 
the target market, they can also achieve DI by engaging in OI. De alio entrants may 
utilize their accumulated complementary assets for DI in different segments of the 
same industry. This is how firms such as CIMC and UFIDA were able to capture the 
mainstream market with a low-end disruption. CIMC had complementary assets in 
container manufacturing before it became a disruptor. To enter the refrigerated 
container market, CIMC spun off SCRC and developed a joint venture with a 
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German incumbent Graaff. CIMC started from scratch and eventually improved the 
product and lowered the cost to the point that the Japanese incumbent was forced to 
exit the market. To protect its newly earned position as the market leader, CIMC 
purchased IP from Graaff to enhance its control of the related technology. Similarly, 
UFIDA established a strategic alliance with an incumbent to develop a world-class 
product. Though UFIDA started R&D on its own SOA, cooperation with IBM 
allowed them to catch up more quickly and create the U9 enterprise application. 
Besides technology support, the alliance with IBM provided guidance in function 
development, code management and program testing. In this way, UFIDA 
eventually gained the ability to serve the high-end markets. IBM‘s distribution 
networks also expedited UFIDA‘s entry into overseas markets including Hong Kong, 
Japan and other Asian countries. These two cases show that DI is not driven only by 
technology – sometimes DI is more about how to make use of technology. 
Latecomers may share disruptive ideas with incumbents and incumbents may work 
with latecomers to commercialize DI. In these two case studies, it is clear that 
cooperation was a win-win situation for the latecomers (CIMC, UFIDA) and the 
incumbents (Graaff, IBM). 
To summarize, the above case analysis is based on Teece‘s (1986) classic 
framework examining whether and when OI happens in the DI context. The OI 
strategies are shown in the form of different modes, such as licensing, strategic 
alliance, joint venture, etc. The results of the case studies show promise that OI 
strategies are applicable in DI development. They also clearly show that OI 
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strategies occur under certain circumstances in the Chinese latecomer cases. Thus, I 
make the following four propositions based on the above case analysis. 
Proposition 1. In cases where latecomers have complementary assets and IP, DI can 
be achieved without OI. This may be because de alio latecomers are able to leverage 
complementary assets created in other markets. 
Proposition 2. In cases where latecomers lack complementary assets and IP in the 
target market, they may win by using OI practices in developing and introducing a 
DI into the market. However, this is only possible for the latecomers who can 
subsequently develop their own complementary assets or IP. 
Proposition 3. In cases where latecomers have IP but not the required 
complementary assets, they can undertake OI strategies to gain access to external 
complementary assets to commercialize DI.  
Proposition 4.  In cases where latecomers have the required complementary assets 
but without IP in the target market, they can source external technologies to achieve 
DI by engaging in OI. 
4.4.2Utilization of Open Innovation by Latecomer Disruptors and Incumbents 
Based on the above multiple-case analysis, this essay provides three ways to benefit 
both latecomer disruptors and incumbents to combine OI and DI. These may occur 
during the foothold stage and/or the competitive stage of  DI. This  section  describes 
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each way in more detail.  
Way 1. OI facilitates a latecomer’s survival or the success of DI. 
Latecomer disruptors can leverage OI to reduce investment risk and time to market. 
For example, the rise of e-bike firms during the foothold stage can be attributed to 
cooperation between specialized firms. Close cooperation among members in the e-
bike community allowed them to share risk, reduce costs and quickly respond to 
customers. Similarly, UFIDA‘s cooperation with IBM greatly reduced the time to 
market for U9 and assured its quality. It is also important to note that, in order to be 
a successful disruptor, the disruptive technology must improve continuously during 
the competitive stage. OI, such as cooperation with other firms, can help latecomers 
improve more quickly. For example, Galanz cooperated with incumbents to gain 
complementary assets before it became the leading OEM. This core competence as a 
manufacturer was essential to the global success of Galanz‘s microwave ovens.  
Regarding the choice of OI modes in the DI cases, latecomers commonly used the 
contractual mode, such as licensing, strategic alliance or joint venture, but seldom 
used the acquisition mode, such as M&A. One possible reason is that latecomers 
cannot commit a large amount of resources or manage the complexity of the 
operations of two firms during M&A. The other key reason is that the acquired firms 
are already in an existing market. That is, the acquiring mode usually facilitates the 
entry into an existing market rather than new market creation. Thus, the latecomers 
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who engaged in M&A are most likely trying to catch up with market trends rather 
than trying to disrupt others.  
Way 2. OI allows both latecomers and incumbents to be involved in DI. 
Latecomers and incumbents may struggle to innovate effectively if they rely solely 
on internal R&D. The incumbents in the case studies, namely Graaff and IBM, as 
well as many others have started to explore the possibility of increasing their R&D 
productivity by tapping into externally developed innovations. In many cases, high-
tech latecomers in emerging economies are an interesting source of ideas and 
technologies. One reason is that they are closer to emerging markets and sensitive to 
their latent needs. For instance, UFIDA effectively localized U9 to meet the 
increasing needs of Chinese enterprises. Even though SAP and Oracle were aware of 
SOA‘s potential in enterprise applications, their existing clients were resistant to new 
software. Secondly, latecomers‘ fresh knowledge promotes innovation and has the 
potential to trigger DI opportunities. Thirdly, less constraint from the organizational 
routine allows latecomers to take risks and take advantage of changes in resources, 
processes and values. Often rich in ideas, latecomers may wish to cooperate with 
incumbents to make up for their lack of resources. For example, the successful 
commercialization of Haier America‘s wine cellar relied on incumbents‘ distribution 
channels and technological support. The involvement of OI in commercializing DI 
allows both latecomers and incumbents to seize potentially huge growth 
opportunities and share the high risk of uncertain markets. Moreover, many 
  123 
contractual modes of OI in the DI cases, i.e., licensing, strategic alliance and joint 
venture, allow the co-existence of latecomers and incumbents.  
Way 3. OI enables incumbents to disrupt themselves. 
Incumbents can learn a lot from the e-bike case, as well as CIMC and Haier‘s 
success stories of DI. It is possible for an incumbent to disrupt themselves by 
engaging in OI. This can be illustrated by the case of XinDaYang Group Co. Ltd in 
China‘s two-wheeler revolution (the e-bike case in this study). As a domestic 
motorcycle manufacturing incumbent, XinDaYang Group was supposed to be 
disrupted by e-bike producers; however, this did not happen. Instead of being 
disrupted by others, XinDaYang Group became a pioneer propelling the e-bikes 
revolution by leveraging their technology advantage of motor development. When e-
bike emerged in the late 1990s, XinDaYang Group started to develop a specialized 
motor for e-bikes. This brushless motor was introduced by XinDaYang Group in 
2003, and significantly improved the e-bike‘s performance in terms of efficiency, 
reliability and other key performance measures. Shortly after, XinDaYang Group 
established partnerships with the key e-bike producers (e.g., LuYuan) through OI, 
and has since become a core component supplier for the entire industry.  
When dealing with innovations that do not fit with the current business model, firms 
could also spin them off or license them out. In the case of CIMC‘s refrigerated 
containers, licensing agreements signed with German incumbent Graaff provided the 
key technology resources to pursue the disruptive opportunity and reengineer the 
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product. However, this does not necessarily mean the technology stimulates the 
disruptive features e.g., simple, low cost, etc. There is a need of a systematic way to 
check for disruptiveness, such as a modified stage gate process (Danneels, 2004; Yu 
and Hang, 2011). To ensure that spin-offs or licensees do not become their disruptor, 
firms can position them in different market segments to explore opportunities for 
new growth. For instance, rather than replacing Haier‘s existing products, Haier 
America‗s wine cellar expanded the market territory. Alternatively, firms can 
include clauses that allow them to use new technology developed by their spin-offs 
and licensees. In this way, incumbents can protect themselves from potential 
disruption and disrupt themselves. 
 
4.5 Summary  
This essay explored the conditions of applying OI to commercialize DI and then 
identified situations where cooperation between latecomer disruptors and 
incumbents benefitted both firms. It has contributed three important research 
implications to the literature, which are summarized as follows. 
Though a great number of studies have examined how latecomers disrupt the 
mainstream market and surpass incumbents, few have investigated the possibilities 
of cooperation between latecomers and incumbents in developing DI. This study 
concurs with Christensen (1997) that there is competition between latecomer 
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disruptors and incumbents, but it is shown that this only happens at the point in the 
competition when the disruptive product and existing product meet in the same tier 
of the market. Utterback and Acee (2005) contended that the true importance of 
disruptive technology could be to create new markets rather than to displace existing 
products. Cooper and Schendel (1976) pointed out that latecomers‘ market 
expansion is less of a threat to incumbents than other firms introducing substitute 
products. Thus, latecomer disruptors and incumbents are potentially well suited to 
cooperate with each other. The finding of the importance of OI between latecomers 
and incumbents in many DI cases gives a fresh perspective to the existing DI 
literature that focuses on competition (Christensen, 1997). I found that OI could 
facilitate latecomer disruptors and incumbents to work together to create new value, 
especially in the pursuit of emerging and non-consumption markets. The cooperative 
scenarios found in the case studies provide us with better understanding of the role 
of OI in developing DI. 
This essay underscored the implications of the model of Gans and Stern (2003) in 
the context of DI. The contingencies whether latecomer disruptors openly cooperate 
with incumbents are closely related to complementary assets and IP that they own. 
Gans and Stern‘s (2003) classical analysis of cooperation possibilities between 
latecomers and incumbents was adapted to identify these conditions and predict 
whether cooperation is a strategic choice. This essay identified an additional 
situation from the DI cases, which was overlooked by the model of Gans and Stern‘s 
(2003). In a situation where complementary assets and IP are not important for 
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commercializing a new technology, Gans and Stern (2003) expected competition 
and cooperation strategies would both be effective and latecomers would compete 
with incumbents for technology priority. However, in the e-bike case study, there 
was no technology competition between the latecomers (e-bike firms) and 
incumbents (motorbike firms), and the situation favoured the latecomers (e-bike 
firms). This was partially caused by government policy which supported the e-bike 
industry for its environmental benefits. Moreover, most of the motorbike firms were 
probably unwilling to enter the e-bike industry in view of its low profit margins.  
This essay enhances the understanding of cooperation strategies at times of 
technological discontinuities (Spedale, 2003; Hüsig and Hipp, 2009). The 
implications of cooperation strategies evidenced in the context of radical 
technological change by Spedale (2003) are not applicable for latecomers in DI 
development. In contrast, the essay gave evidence that latecomers, such as UFIDA, 
who concentrate on specialized markets, can undertake structured cooperation (at the 
inter-organizational level) and successfully sustain the development of the new 
technology. Though radical and disruptive technology both can lead to discontinuous 
innovation, the former appears to be a greater threat to existing products. This is 
because the beauty of DI development is more about the business model, rather than 
the technology itself like radical innovation. Thus, latecomers may find the 
technology with disruptive potential in the market and cooperate with the technology 
owner. Besides trading for technologies, in the case of UFIDA‘s U9, cooperation 
with the incumbent – IBM – help build the competitive advantage in terms of 
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reputation, international distribution network, etc. Similarly, Spedale‘s (2003) 
finding – ―latecomers tend to concentrate in specialist niches where leading-edge 
applications are explored and developed (specialist, technology-push strategy) at 
times of radical technological change‖ – cannot be generalized in the context of DI. I 
found the latecomers in the specialist niches, such as Haier America, can apply the 
market pull strategy in developing DI. Moreover, the essay identified the latecomers, 
such as CIMC, who utilize technology-pull strategy also can successfully capture the 
traditional mainstream market. Despite more difficulties in disrupting the existing 
technology in the traditional mainstream than the specialist niches, latecomers can 
strategically partner with less dominate players to raise the chance to win. Without 
structured cooperation with others, fierce competition in the competitive stage of DI 
will challenge latecomers to survive even though they may enter from the low-end of 
the foothold market. And only if latecomers are de alio entrants with strong 
complementary assets in the target market, as in the case of CIMC‘s refrigerated 
containers, are they likely to achieve the performance improvement and eventually 
disrupt the industry leader. In addition, it was clearly observed that there are more 
cases, such as Haier‘s ―mini magical child‖, Galanz microwave and e-bike, related to 
the market-pull strategy. All latecomers in those cases uncovered the latent needs in 
developing economies and then rapidly grew the market, and eventually became 
strong global players.  
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                                              CHAPTER 5. 
                                           CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary of Theoretical Contributions  
Latecomer firms from emerging economies have long wowed the world with their 
technological catching-up over the last decade. This thesis explores the reasons 
why some latecomers could become upcoming innovators by utilizing external 
resources, i.e., open innovation. Despite the vast literature on open innovation 
strategies in developed economies, it is insufficient to use current understanding to 
explain the catching-up cases in emerging economies. In fact, latecomers deserve 
special attention in the strategic management literature, because they face the 
critical ―do or die‖ situation where every action they take needs to be prudent in 
order to survive. Furthermore, the uncertainties caused by resource constraints 
mean that latecomers cannot afford to make any wrong decisions. The extant 
literature on external resource utilization has not investigated enough details of 
these survival strategies. 
To fill the research gap, this thesis provides important strategic guidance for 
latecomers to effectively turn external resources into innovative capabilities. The 
findings reveal that the latent relationships between the key determinants in the 
strategic choice of which target to acquire affects the subsequent innovation 
performance. The uniqueness of latecomers – the nature of being a technological 
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laggard and special catching-up trajectory – largely causes them to undertake open 
innovation differently from incumbents. By examining this uniqueness, this thesis 
presents both quantitative and qualitative findings that contribute broadly to the 
strategic management literature.  
I have concluded that open innovation can help latecomers promote innovation 
under certain contingencies. Specifically, I investigated latecomer strategies in 
using open innovation‘s two extreme mechanisms according to the complexity 
ranking, i.e., licensing and M&A. Furthermore, I investigated the combinative 
utilization of licensing and M&A, as well as other open innovation mechanisms, in 
latecomers‘ favourable catching-up trajectory, i.e., disruptive innovation. The main 
theoretical contributions throughout the whole thesis include the three following 
aspects:  
First, the age of licensed-in technology is the first being investigated in this thesis. 
The existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of the quantity of licenses and 
shows mixed results of the linear relationship (i.e., positive, negative or 
insignificant) with innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Álvarez et al., 
2002; Johnson, 2002; Tsai and Wang, 2009). By considering the technology age, I 
found a curvilinear (an inverted U) relationship between the number of licenses 
and the licensee‘s innovation performance (H1). The inverted U shape reveals that 
a moderate level of the quantity of licenses should be compatible with the existing 
absorptive capacity. Indeed, the technology recency most positively affects the 
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growth of innovation (H2). The positive effects of the number of licenses and 
technology recency are more likely to be observed in latecomers with high 
absorptive capacity (H3, H4).  
Second, substitution effect in M&A is found to be more important for latecomers. 
The existing literature mainly treats M&A as a strategy to maximize synergies and 
further identifies an inverted U relationship between technology similarity and 
innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). In the 
context of technologically laggard firms, this thesis discovers that latecomers do 
not have enough absorptive capacity to acquire different technologies (H1). 
However, latecomers can acquire a target with competent new technologies to 
substitute their existing technologies. This substitution will result in an innovation 
performance that is proportional to the joint effect of the size and the distance of 
the technology acquired (H2).  
Third, this thesis presents novel research in the application of open innovation to 
develop disruptive innovation. Disruptive innovation is the trajectory that best 
enables latecomers to enter a market and potentially become leaders. This kind of 
competition with incumbents has been greatly emphasized in the existing 
disruptive innovation literature (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, 2003; Utterback 
and Acee, 2005). However, cooperation with incumbents through open innovation 
has yet to be studied as a viable strategy for disruptive innovation. This thesis 
suggests several ways that open innovation can be successfully applied in 
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disruptive innovation under certain conditions. The basic conditions for combining 
open innovation and disruptive innovation are based on the complementary assets 
and IP owned by latecomers. Furthermore, latecomers need to develop the 
acquired assets in a complementary way to enhance the competitive advantage. 
The enabling role of open innovation for latecomers and incumbents to cooperate 
indeed aids the success of disruptive innovation in three ways, which extend the 
view of open innovation in disruptive innovation theory: (1) open innovation 
facilitates a latecomer‘s survival or the success of disruptive innovation; (2) open 
innovation allows both latecomers and incumbents to be involved in disruptive 
innovation; and (3) open innovation enables incumbents to disrupt themselves 
when needed.  
 
5.2 Summary of Managerial Implications 
Based on the above findings, this thesis offers the following important managerial 
implications. First of all, latecomers have more flexible strategic choices than 
incumbents and more determinants to consider when utilizing open innovation. 
Besides the common determinants like the quantity of technology (size of the 
knowledge base in this thesis), latecomers need to address the characteristics of the 
technology in their open innovation strategy, such as the age, technology distance 
and interactions among determinants. This thesis sheds light on latecomers‘ new 
strategies for growth. To a certain extent, the first two essays represent an attempt 
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to open the ―black box‖ – how to integrate the external resources – through a 
closer empirical investigation of the above determinants. In addition to the 
empirical investigation, the qualitative study in the last essay offers new insights 
for using open innovation in the specific innovation trajectory favoured by 
latecomers. The managerial implications are detailed below.  
The thesis reveals latecomer strategies for successful learning by licensing. It 
discloses that latecomers‘ ITL strategy is not only about how much learning can be 
achieved from licensing, but also about identifying the right technology resources 
to learn. The direct implication is that ITL enables latecomers to enlarge their 
knowledge pool in a short period of time, although extra time and resources are 
required to fully absorb licensed-in technologies. Licensed-in technologies can 
serve as seeds that spur internal R&D development, but resource allocation to 
internal R&D development is critical in the long run. In the case where competitors 
are not willing to license out some of their core technologies, latecomers must 
accumulate technological capability to compensate for the shortage of technology 
available in the market. Thus, latecomers need to optimize their resource allocation 
between ITL and internal R&D development. The other important implication of 
this study is for the long-term planning of technological capability development. 
Latecomers may not be fully motivated to purchase patents to compensate for their 
technology shortfalls, but building them into their patent portfolios is the best 
approach for promoting their technological capability development. In high-tech 
fields, licensing as a fast track to transfer technology may spur a firm‘s 
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technological learning and innovation for competency building. Furthermore, 
learning from the latest technology rather than older technology has prominent 
advantages, especially for latecomers who have been accumulating absorptive 
capacity. Instead of passive licensing to fill technology gaps, updating their 
technology portfolios by strategically importing the right technology is a wiser 
way for latecomers to grow steadily and achieve technological catching-up. 
On the other hand, when the assumption that external resources have to be 
integrated is dropped, a flexible strategic choice to substitute the competency of 
target for the existing one should be recognized. This is the main focus of the 
second essay in this thesis. The empirical findings provide guidance to managers 
who are increasingly involved with technological catching-up via M&A, and 
suggest that firms should manage strategic choices based on the characteristics of 
their technology bases. Essay Two emphasizes that both the quantitative (e.g., 
knowledge base) and qualitative dimensions (e.g., technological distance) between 
the target and acquiring firm matter a great deal for the post-M&A innovation 
performance. Although this essay focuses on situations where the acquiring firms 
have low technological capabilities relative to firms in developed economies 
(Mathews, 2002) and where the target firms are technology-related (Jaffe, 1986), it 
provides takeaways for managing the success of post-M&A innovation 
performance, as summarized in Figure 5-1. In the case of latecomers in emerging 
economies, their primary goal is to realize the potential technological catching-up. 
Substituting the existing competency with an advanced one through M&A is 
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probably the easiest and fastest way to catch up, especially for latecomers without 
the burden of knowledge rigidity and organizational inertia. Even though some 
latecomers acquire in order to achieve economies of scale, the inferior absorptive 
capacity and management challenges in the integrating firm would easily kill the 
chance of success in M&A, and thus it is only possible to acquire for quantitative 
complementarity. However, when a firm with a high technological capability 
acquires a target with similar technology, it is reasonable the firm to maximize 
synergies to complement its existing competency. This occurs because this firm is 
likely a forerunner in its field and if the firm already possesses a well-established 
technological capability, there is no reason to sacrifice the existing competency for 
a new one. In the case of acquiring target firms that are technologically unrelated 
to the existing business, more management challenges appear in the integrated 
organization and M&A can only be successful if they are conquered. This is the 
case even for firms in developed economies. In cases where latecomers have low 
technological capabilities, the post-M&A innovation is only achievable by 
qualitative complementarity, not quantitative complementarity. It is possible to 
innovate by combining technologies from totally different industries, but the 
inferior absorptive capacity associated with a poor technology accumulation goes 
nowhere for latecomers to spend additional efforts integrating a large amount of 
external resources.  
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              Figure 5-1. Proposed matrix for measuring successful M&A 
 












Furthermore, this thesis has investigated the innovation trajectories for latecomers 
from emerging economies. The empirically verified strategies in the first two 
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market by external resources acquisition and become innovators. To promote 
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development, licensing appears to be an essential strategy. Licensing is the most 
commonly adopted strategy to access technology in all the cases, while M&A 
occurs less frequently. It is understood that fewer latecomers can pursue M&A due 
to its greater complexity (Marks and Mirvis, 1998). The underlying cause can be 
also tracked by the specific innovation trajectory and revels that not every 
catching-up firm conducts disruptive innovation. A firm that pursues M&A tends 
to enter the existing market that the target firm are in, and thus does not create a 
new market or disrupt others. In other words, the strategy to pursue disruptive 
innovation may be viewed as an alternative to M&A.  
The in-depth case studies also provide insights into opportunity exploitation for 
disruptive innovation. The three ways to exploit disruptive opportunities are 
summarized. First, a latecomer may seek opportunities to cooperate with an 
incumbent that is less dominant in the market. This may lead to a collaborative effort, 
which eventually allows the firms to disrupt the market. CIMC‘s refrigerated 
container is a typical case illustrating how a latecomer seized an opportunity at a 
time when the incumbent was failing and created a good-enough product with a 
much lower price that eventually came to dominate the market. Second, niche 
markets can serve as shortcuts for latecomers to enter new fields. Since incumbents 
often underestimate niche markets, they are good places for latecomers to develop 
disruptive innovation. For instance, Haier America‘s wine cellar served as an 
important starting point for Haier to enter the global compact fridge market. Third, 
some latecomers are able to foresee booming opportunities that incumbents miss due 
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to their focus on sustaining innovation (Christensen, 1997). After UFIDA nearly 
missed an opportunity to enter the high-end market, it was motivated to seek new 
solutions. The success of UFIDA‘s U9 demonstrated the importance of anticipating 
market trends that can allow latecomers to jump into new areas and enlarge the 
market.  
In addition, the third essay challenges the traditional globalization strategy of 
―think global, act local‖. It demonstrates that open innovation helps local 
innovations grow as global applications, albeit its effectiveness is contingent upon 
the firm itself. That is, it is possible for latecomers to introduce pioneer 
innovations in emerging economies and then become international players. 
Latecomers may adopt the strategy of ―design local, go global‖ by climbing up the 
value chain to become innovators, despite their humble beginning from 
downstream, such as manufacturing. It is also notable that most of the disruptive 
innovation cases are new market disruptions that meet latent needs at the bottom of 
the pyramid markets (Prahalad, 2004, 2012; Ray and Ray, 2011). Thus, the 
traditional top-down approach of ―think global, act local‖ may not be suitable for 
latecomer firms from emerging economies.  
Finally, policy makers can largely contribute to facilitating open innovation 
implementation as ―invisible hands‖ (Ahmad, 1990). This thesis confirms that the 
presence of markets for technology and markets for ideas facilitate technological 
learning and innovation, especially for technologically laggard firms. Developing 
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the ecosystem that facilitates technology and idea transfer is an important 
instrument that policy makers can employ to promote technological development. 
In this way, policy makers in emerging economies can pay more attention to the 
market order and an appropriate IPR environment in order to motivate business 
activities. Similarly, formulating policies that encourage domestic firms to actively 
adopt open innovation strategies to make market entry is necessary because 
external resource acquisition plays an important role in the formation of innovative 
capabilities. Furthermore, policy makers may provide incentives for firms to climb 
the industry value chain and gradually develop their innovation capabilities. For 
instance, Chinese e-bike firms greatly benefited from the decentralized 
manufacturing and the industry modularity. Even though they come from humble 
beginnings, firms can tap into the disruptive opportunities and eventually become 
the industry leaders.  
 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
This thesis is subject to various qualifications and raises a number of questions for 
further work. 
First, the analysis of the effect of licensing and M&A on R&D outcomes was 
carried out from the angle of the demand side, i.e., the licensees and acquiring 
firms. The dynamics between being a recipient and a supplier in a technology 
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market have not been addressed from a latecomer‘s perspective. A host of 
interesting research questions may arise about the drivers and conditions of the role 
of shifting between technology recipient and supplier from both the strategic and 
economic efficiency views.  
Second, the technology strategic literature indicates there are different open 
innovation mechanisms that help latecomers access external resources to achieve 
technological catching-up. I believe that different open innovation mechanisms may 
have different success rates when utilized by different types of latecomers. Of the 
various open innovation strategies examined in this thesis, I did not try to identify 
which one was ideal and only used them to illustrate their supporting roles in 
innovation development. For example, even though the latecomers included de novo 
and de alio entrants, I did not go further to analyze if there exist any differences in 
their use of open innovation in order to stay the focus. This may open a potential 
line of new research investigating which mechanism is a desirable alternative for 
latecomers and when these alternatives are complementary, e.g., licensing and 
M&A. 
Third, this thesis focuses on some factors with regard to the qualitative and 
quantitative dimensions of technology, such as technology age, technology 
distance and knowledge base. Latecomers‘ success is also driven by other factors, 
such as public policy, management perceptions, organizational routines, cultures, 
etc., which have not been addressed in this thesis. Analysis of those additional 
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factors may give a more comprehensive view of latecomer strategies. For instance, 
research could expand on the conditions for acquiring new or old technologies by 
examining the managements‘ perceptions of whether the acquisition was motivated 
by exploration or exploitation in organisational learning. 
Fourth, this thesis looked into latecomer strategies and mainly addressed the 
research questions from a latecomer‘s perspective. For instance, the third essay 
concentrates on the conditions leading to open innovation that help latecomers 
achieve disruptive innovation; the essay did not focus on the outcomes for 
incumbents. Only in two cases (UFIDA‘s U9 and e-bike) did I address how 
cooperation with a latecomer helped an incumbent (IBM and XinDaYang Group) 
extend its market presence. This open innovation eventually led to fierce 
competition with other incumbents (SAP/Oracle and motorcycle manufacturers). In 
the value creation network, it would be interesting to study the feedback loop to 
the incumbent‘s side. The same research questions could be examined from the 
incumbent‘s perspective to uncover how incumbents may learn from latecomers 
through open innovation.  
Finally, the studies in this thesis are based on the context of high-tech firms in 
China, one of the fastest growing economic embodiments within the last decade. 
The strategies demonstrated in this thesis highlight the strategic development 
routes for latecomers on the rise in high-tech industries. However, these strategies  
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for technological catching-up may be context-sensitive. For example, firms from 
South Korea and other Asian ―four tigers‖ economies followed the export-growth 
path for technological catching-up (Xie and Wu, 2003), while firms from China 
and Japan started from the local market-focused path. A comparative study of the 
research questions over different countries will offer a deeper understanding of 
latecomer strategies that takes into account contextual factors. Nevertheless, this 
thesis could serve as a basic reference for further research in diverse contexts, as 












  142 
                                        BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adner, R. 2002. When are technologies disruptive? A demand-based view of the 
emergence of competition. Strategic Management Journal, 23(8): 667-688. 
Afuah, A.N. and Utterback, J.M. 1991. The emergence of a new supercomputer 
architecture. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 40(4): 315-328. 
Ahmad S. 1990. Adam Smith's four invisible hands. History of Political Economy, 
22(1): 137-144. 
Ahuja, G. and Katila, R. 2001. Technological acquisitions and the innovation 
performance of acquiring firms: A longitudinal study. Strategic Management 
Journal, 22(3): 197-220. 
Ahuja, G. and Lampert, C.M. 2001. Entrepreneurship in large corporations: a 
longitudinal study of how established firms create breakthrough inventions. 
Strategic Management Journal, 22: 521-554. 
Akbulut, M. and Matsusaka, J. 2010. 50+ years of diversification announcements. 
Financial Review, 45: 231-262.  
Álvarez, R., Crespi, G. and Ramos, J. 2002. The impact of licenses on a ―Late 
Starter‖ LDC: Chile in the 1990s. World Development, 30(8): 1445-1460. 
  143 
Amburgey, T.L., Kelly, D. and Barnett, W.P. 1993. Resetting the clock: The 
dynamics of organizational change and failure. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
38: 51-73. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E. 2001. New evidence and perspectives 
on mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15: 103-120. 
Arora, A. and Gambardella, A. 2010. The market for technology. In Hall B. H. and 
Rosenberg, N. (eds.), Economics of Innovation, Handbook of the Economics of 
Innovation. UK: Oxford, 642-665. 
Atuahene-Gima, K. 1993. Determinants of inward technology licensing intentions: 
an empirical analysis of Australian engineering firms. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 10(3): 230-240. 
Bain, J.S. 1956. Barriers to New Competition, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1): 99-120. 
Bell, M. 1984. ‗Learning‘ and the accumulation of industrial technological capacity 
in developing countries. In Fransman, M. and King, K. (eds.), Technological 
Capability in the Third World. London: Macmillan, 187-209. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. 1967. The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday & Co. 
  144 
Breschi, S., Lissoni, F. and Malerba, F. 2003. Knowledge-relatedness in firm 
technological diversification. Research Policy, 32(1): 69-87. 
Brunner, R. 1998. The use of excess cash and debt capacity as a motive for merger. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23(2): 199-217. 
Burns, L.R., Sean, N. and John, E. 2005. Mergers, acquisitions and the advantages of 
scale in the pharmaceutical industry. In Burns, L. R. (eds.), The Business of 
Healthcare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 223-270.  
Calof, J.L.1994. The relationship between firm size and export behavior. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 25(2): 367-387. 
Cameron, C.A. and Trivedi, P.K. 1998. Regression Analysis of Count Data. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Campa,  J.M.  and   Kedia,  S.  2002.  Explaining  the  diversification  discount. 
Journal of Finance, 57(4): 1731-1762.  
Cangelosi, V.E., and Dill, W.R. 1965. Organizational learning: Observations 
toward a theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 10(2): 175-203. 
Capron, L. 1999. The long-term performance of horizontal acquisitions. Strategic 
Management Journal, 20(11): 987-1018. 
Capron, L. and Pistre, N. 2002. When do acquirers earn abnormal returns? Strategic 
  145 
Management Journal, 23(9): 781-794. 
Carlile, P.R. and Christensen, C.M. 2005. The Cycles of Theory Building in 
Management Research. Boston: Harvard Business School. Work Paper, No. 05-057. 
Cartwright, S. 2005. Mergers and acquisitions: An update and appraisal. In 
Hodgkinson, G.P. and Ford, J.K. (eds.), International Review of Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology. Chichester: John Wiley, 20:1-38. 
Centre Watch, 2000. Troubling Numbers for Big Pharma Consolidation, 2-3. 
Charitou, C. and Markides, C. 2003. Responses to disruptive strategic innovation. 
Sloan Management Review, 44(2): 55-63.  
Chatterji, D. 1996. Accessing external sources of technology. Research Technology 
Management, 39(2): 569-559. 
Chesbrough, H. 2003. Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Chesbrough, H., Vanhaverbeke, W. and West, J. 2006. Open Innovation: 
Researching a New Paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chen, C.H. and Shin, H.T. 2008. Mergers and Acquisitions in China: Impacts of 
WTO Accession. MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
  146 
Child, J., Pitkethly, R. and Faulkner, D. 1999. Changes in management practice and 
the post-acquisition performance achieved by direct investors in the UK. British 
Journal of Management, 10(3): 185-198. 
China Statistics Yearbook, 2011. China High-tech Industry Data Book 2011. 
http://www.sts.org.cn/sjkl/gjscy/data2011/data11.pdf 
Cho, D.S., Kim, D.J. and Rhee, D.K. 1998. Latecomer strategies: Evidence from the 
semiconductor industry in Japan and Korea. Organization Science, 9(4): 489-505. 
Christensen, C.M. 1997. The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies 
Cause Great Firms to Fail. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Christensen, C.M. and Raynor, M.E. 2003. The Innovator's Solution: Creating and 
Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Christensen, C.M. 2006. The ongoing process of building a theory of disruption. 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 23(1): 39-55. 
Christensen, C.M., Anthony, S.D. and Roth, E.A. 2004. Seeing What's Next. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Cloodt, M., Hagedoom, J. and Kranenburg, H.V. 2006. Mergers and acquisitions: 
Their effect on the innovative performance of companies in high-tech industries. 
Research Policy, 35(5): 642-654. 
  147 
Cockburn, I. 2006. Is the pharmaceutical industry in a productivity crisis? In Jaffe, 
A., Lerner, J. and Stern, S. (eds). Innovation Policy and the Economy. MA: MIT 
Press, 7: 1-32. 
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. 1989. Innovation and learning: The two faces of 
R&D. The Economic Journal, 99(397): 569-596.  
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective of 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 128-152. 
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. 1994. Fortune favors the prepared ﬁrm. 
Management Science, 40(2): 227-251. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1985. Utilization of the Results of 
Community Sponsored R, D. and D. In: Newsletter – new technologies and 
innovation policy, Nr.46. Luxembourg: 2-10. 
Conn, C., Cosh, A., Guest, P. and Hughes, A. 2001. Long Run Share Performance 
of UK Firms Engaging in Cross Border Acquisitions. University of Cambridge, 
Centre for Business Related Research. Working Essay, No. 214. 
Cording, M., Christmann, P. and Bourgeois, L.J. III. 2002. A Focus on the 
Resources in M&A Success: a Literature Review to Resolve Two Paradoxes. Essay 
presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Denver, US.    
  148 
Cooke, F.L. 2006. Acquisitions of state-owned enterprises by MNCs: Driving forces, 
barriers and implications for HRM. British Journal of Management, 17: 5105-5121. 
Cooper, A. and Schendel, D. 1976. Strategic responses to technological threats. 
Business Horizons, 19(1): 61-69. 
Corsten, H. 1987. Technology transfer from universities to small and medium-
sized enterprises — an empirical survey from the standpoint of such enterprises. 
Technovation, 6(1): 57-68. 
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2nd edition. 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell.  
 
Dahlander, L. and Gannb, D.M. 2010. How open is innovation? Research Policy, 39 
(6): 699-709. 
Dahlman, C.J., Larsen, B.R. and Westphal, L.E. 1987. Managing technological 
development: Lessons from the newly industrializing countries. World Development, 
15(6): 759-775. 
Danneels, E. 2004. Disruptive technology reconsidered: A critique and research 
agenda. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 21(4): 246-258. 
Danzon, P., Epstein, A. and Nicholson, S. 2007. Mergers and acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28 
(4/5): 307-328. 
  149 
Davidson, W.H. and McFetridge, D.G. 1985. Key characteristics in the choice of 
international technology transfer mode. Journal of International Business Studies, 
16(2): 5-21.  
Drejer, A. 2000. Organizational learning and competence development. The 
Learning Organization, 7(4): 206-220. 
Eisenhardt, K. and Graebner, M.E. 2007. Theory building from cases: Opportunities 
and challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 25-32. 
Engelsman, E.C. and van Raan, A.F.J. 1992. A patent-based cartography of 
technology. Research Policy, 23(1):1-26. 
Ettlie, J.E. and Rubenstein A.H. 1987. Firm size and product innovation. Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, 4(2): 89-108. 
Fabrizio, K.R. 2009. Absorptive capacity and the search for innovation. Research 
Policy, 38(2): 255-267. 
Fleisher, B., Li, H. and Zhao, M.Q. 2010. Human capital, economic growth, and 
regional inequality in China. Journal of Development Economics, 92(2): 215-231. 
Fleming, L. 2001. Recombinant uncertainty in technological search. Management 
Science, 47(1): 117-132.  
Fosfuri, A. 2000. Patent Protection, imitation, and the mode of technology transfer. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(7): 1129-1149.  
  150 
Fosfuri, A. 2006. The licensing dilemma: Understanding the determinants of the 
rate of technology licensing. Strategic Management Journal, 27(12): 1141-1158.  
Gallini, N.T. 2002. The economics of patents: Lessons from recent US patent reform. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2): 131-154. 
Gambardella, A. 1992. Competitive advantages from in-house scientific research: 
the US pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s. Research Policy, 21(5): 391-407. 
Gans, J.S., Hsu, D. and Stern, S. 2002. When does start-up innovation spur the gale 
of creative destruction? RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (4): 571-586. 
Gans, J.S. and Stern, S. 2003. The product market and the market for ―Ideas‖: 
commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy, 32(2): 
333-350. 
Gatignon, H., Tushman, M.L., Smith, W. and Anderson, P. 2002. A structural 
approach to assessing innovation: Construct development of innovation locus, type 
and Characteristics. Management Science, 48(9): 1103-1122.  
Gillbert, C. 2003. The disruption opportunity. MIT Sloan Management Review, 
44(4): 27-32. 
Gould, D.M. and Gruben, W.C. 1996. The role of intellectual property rights in 
economic growth. Journal of Development Economics, 48(2): 323-350. 
  151 
Govindarajan, V. and Kopalle, P.K. 2005. Disruptiveness of innovations: 
Measurement and an assessment of reliability and validity. Strategic Management 
Journal, 27(2): 189-199. 
Govindarajan, V. and Kopalle, P.K. 2006. The usefulness of measuring 
disruptiveness of innovations ex post in making ex ante predictions. Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, 23(1): 12-18. 
Grant, R.M. 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategy 
Management Journal, 17:109-122. 
Greene, W. 2008. Econometric Analysis, sixth edition. Prentice Hall: Englewood 
Cliffs. 
Griliches, Z. 1979. Issues in assessing the contribution of research and 
development to productivity growth. Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1): 92-116. 
Griliches, Z. 1998. R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Grünfeld, L.A. 2003. Meet me halfway but don‘t rush: absorptive capacity and 
strategic R&D investment revisited. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 21:1091-1120. 
Guasch, J. L. and Weiss, A. 1980. Adverse selection by markets and the advantage 
of being late. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(3): 453-466. 
  152 
Hall, B.H., Jaffe, A.B. and Trajtenberg, M. 2001. The NBER Patent Citations Data 
File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools. The National Bureau of 
Economic Research.Working Paper No. 8498.   
Haspeslagh, C. and Jemison, B. 1991. Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value 
through Corporate Renewal. New York: The Free Press. 
Hatzichronoglou, T. 1997. Revision of the High-tech Sector and Product 
Classification. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 1997/02. 
OECD Publishing. 
Hausman, J.A., Hall, B.H. and Griliches, Z. 1984. Econometric models for count 
data with an application to the patents – R&D relationship. Econometrica, 52(4): 
909-938. 
He, Z.L., Lim, K.H. and Wong, P.K. 2006. Entry and competitive dynamics in the 
mobile telecommunications market. Research Policy, 35(8): 1147-1165. 
Henderson, R.M. and  Cockburn, I. 1994. Measuring  competence? Evidence from 
the pharmaceutical drug discovery. Strategic  Management  Journal, 15(S1): 63-84. 
Henderson, R.M. and Cockburn, I. 1996. Scale, scope and spillovers: The 
determinants of research productivity in drug discovery. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 27(1): 32-59. 
  153 
Henderson, R.M. 2006. The innovator‘s dilemma as a problem of organizational 
competence. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 23(1): 5-11. 
Hennart, J.F. and Reddy, S. 1997. The choice between mergers/acquisitions and 
joint ventures: the case of Japanese investors in the United States. Strategic 
Management Journal, 18(1):1-12. 
Higgins, M.J. and Rodriguez, D. 2006. The outsourcing of R&D through acquisition 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2): 351-383. 
Hill, C.W.L. 1997. Establishing a standard: competitive strategy and technological 
standards in winner-take-all industries. Academy of Management Executive, 11(2): 
7-25. 
Hitt, M.A., Hoskisson, R.E., Johnson, R.A. and Moesel, D.D. 1996. The market for 
corporate control and firm innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 
39(5):1084-1119. 
Hobday, M. 1995. Innovation in East Asia: The Challenge to Japan. London: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Hofstede, G. and Bond, M.H. 1988. The Confucius connection: From cultural roots 
to economic growth. Organizational Dynamics, 16(4): 5-21. 
Hoskisson, R.E., Lorraine, E., Lau, C.M. and Wright, M. 2000. Strategy in 
emerging economies. The Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 249-267.  
  154 
Hüsig, S. and Hipp, C. 2009. The disruptive potential of Wi-Fi in the German 
hotspot market. International Journal of Mobile Communications, 7(6): 615-631. 
Jaffe, A.B. 1986. Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from 
firm‘s patents, profits, and market value. American Economic Review, 76(5): 984-
1001. 
Jarrel, G., Brickley, J. and Netter, J. 1988. The market for corporate control: The 
empirical evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1): 49-68. 
Jensen, M. and Ruback, R. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific 
evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4): 5-50. 
Johansson, P. 1995. Tests for serial correlation and overdispersion in a count data 
regression model. Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation, 53(3-4): 
153-164. 
Johnson, D. 2002. Learning-by-licensing: R&D and technology licensing in 
Brazilian invention. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 11(3): 163-
177. 
Katila, R. 2002. New product search over time: Past ideas in their prime? Academy 
of Management Journal, 45(5): 995-1010. 
  155 
Katrak, H. 1997. Developing countries‘ imports of technology, in-house 
technological capabilities and efforts: An analysis of the Indian experience. Journal 
of Development Economics, 53(1): 67-83. 
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. 1994. System competition and network effects. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 8(2): 93-115. 
Keller, A and Hüsig, S. 2009. Ex ante identification of disruptive innovations in the 
software industry applied to web applications: The case of Microsoft's vs. Google's 
office applications, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 76(8): 1044-
1054. 
Kennedy, P. 1998. A Guide to Econometrics, fourth edition. MA: The MIT Press. 
Kim, L.S. 1997. Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological 
Learning. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
King, D., Dalton, D., Daily, C. and Covin, J. 2004. Meta-analyses of post acquisition 
performance indications of unidentified moderators. Strategic Management Journal, 
25(2):187-200. 
Kitching, J. 1974. Winning and losing with European acquisitions. Harvard 
Business Review, 52: 124-136. 
Kodama, F. 1995. Emerging Patterns of Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
  156 
Koenig, M.E.D. and Mezick, E.M. 2004. Impact of mergers and acquisitions on 
research productivity within the pharmaceutical industry. Scientometrics, 59(1): 
157-169. 
Kollmer, H. and Dowlin, M. 2004. Licensing as a commercialization strategy for 
new technology-based ﬁrms. Research Policy, 33:1141-1151. 
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. 1996. What firms do? Coordination, identity, and learning, 
Organizational Science, 7(5): 502-518.  
Koschatzky, K. 1998. Firm innovation and region: The role of space in innovation 
processes. International Journal of Innovation Management, 2(4): 383-408. 
Kumar, V., Kumar, U. and Persaud, A. 1999. Building technological capability 
through importing technology: The case of Indonesian manufacturing industry. 
Journal of Technology Transfer, 24: 81-86. 
Lane, P.J., Koka, B.R. and Pathak, S. 2006. The reification of absorptive capacity: A 
critical review and rejuvenation of the construct. Academy of Management Review, 
31(4): 833-863. 
Lane, P.J. and Lubatkin, M. 1998. Relative absorptive capacity and 
interorganizational learning. Strategic Management Journal, 19(5): 461-477.  
Lamont, O. and Polk, C. 2002.  Does  diversification  destroy  value? Evidence from 
the industry  shocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 63(1): 51-77.  
  157 
Laursen, K., Leone M.I. and Torrisi, S. 2010. Technological exploration through 
licensing: New insights from the licensee‘s point of view. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 19(3): 871-897. 
Lee, J. 1996. Technology imports and R&D efforts of Korean manufacturing firms. 
Journal of Development Economics, 50(1): 197-210. 
Lee, K. and Lim, C. 2001. Technology regimes, catching-up and leapfrogging: 
Findings from the Korean industries. Research Policy, 30(3): 459-483. 
Leland, H. 2007. Financial synergies and the optimal scope o the firm: Implications 
for mergers, spinoffs and structured finance. Journal of Finance, 62(2): 765-807. 
Leone, M.I., Boccadel, P., Magnusso, M. and Reichstei, T. 2009. Fuel on the 
Invention Funnel: Technology Licensing-in, Antecedents and Invention 
Performance. Druid Conference (Summer), Denmark.  
Lewellen, W. 1971. A pure financial rationale for the conglomerate merger. 
Journal of Finance, 26(2): 521-537.  
Lieberman, M.B. and Montgomery, D.B. 1998. First-mover (dis)advantages: 
Retrospective and link with the resource-based view. Strategic Management 
Journal, 19(12):1111-1125. 
Link, A., Tassey, G. and Zmud, R.W. 1983. The induce versus purchase decision: 
An empirical analysis of industrial R&D. Decision Sciences, 14(1): 46-61. 
  158 
Lippman, S. and Rumelt, R. 1982. Uncertain imitability: An analysis of interfirm 
differences in efficiency under competition. Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2): 418-
438. 
Liu, W.Q. 2005. Intellectual property protection related to technology in China. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 72(3): 339-348.  
Liu, Z. 1998. Earnings, education, and economic reforms in urban China. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 46(4): 697-725. 
Long, J.S. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent 
Variables. Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences Number 7. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Lowe, J. and Taylor, P. 1998. R&D and technology purchase through license 
agreements: Complementary strategies and complementary assets. R&D 
Management, 28(4): 263-278. 
Lubatkin, M. 1983. Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firm. Academy of 
Management Review, 8(2): 218-225. 
Maddala, G.S. 1983. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in 
Econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
  159 
Makri, M., Hitt, M.A. and Lane, P.J. 2010. Complementary technologies, knowledge 
relatedness and invention outcomes in high technology mergers and acquisitions. 
Strategic Management Journal, 31(6): 602-628. 
Mansfield, E., Romeo, A., Schwartz, D., Teece, D., Wander, S. and Brach, P. 1982. 
Technology Transfer, Productivity and Economic Policy. New York: W. W. Nor 
ton.  
March, J.G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. 
Organization Science, 2(1): 71-87. 
Marks, M.L. and Mirvis, P.H. 1998. Joining Forces: Making One Plus One 
Equal Three in Merger, Acquisition and Alliances. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Mathews, J.A. and Cho, D.S. 1999. Combinative capabilities and organizational 
learning by latecomer firms: The case of the Korean semiconductor industry. 
Journal of World Business, 34(2): 139-156.  
Mathews, J.A. 2002. Competitive advantages of the latecomer firms: A resource-
based account of industrial catch up strategies. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 19: 467-488. 
Mathews, J.A. 2006. Catch-up strategies and the latecomer effect in industrial 
development. New Political Economy, 11(3): 313-335. 
  160 
Matsusaka, J. 1993. Takeover motives during the conglomerate merger wave. 
RAND Journal of Economics, 24(3): 357-379. 
Mowery, D.C., Oxley, J. and Silverman, B. 1996. Strategic alliances and interfirm 
knowledge transfer. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 77-91. 
Narula, R. 2006. Globalization, new ecologies, new zoologies and the purported 
death of the eclectic paradigm. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23(2): 143-
151. 
Neelameghan, A. 1992. Information for Small Enterprises. Bangalore: Sarada 
Ranganathan Endowment for Library Science. 
Nelson, R.R. 1964. Aggregate production functions and medium-range growth 
projections. The American Economic Review, 54(5): 575-606. 
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nelson, R. 1995. Recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change. Journal 
of Economic Literature, 33(1): 48-90. 
Nerkar, A. 2003. Old is gold? The value of temporal exploration in the creation of 
new  knowledge. Management Science, 49(2): 211-229. 
  161 
Nooteboom, B. 2000. Learning by interaction: Absorptive capacity, cognitive 
distance and governance. Journal of Management and Governance, 4(1): 69-92. 
Nooteboom, B., Vanhaverbeke, W., Duijsters, G.M., Gilsing, V.A. and van den 
Oord, A. 2007. Optimal cognitive distance and absorptive capability. Research 
Policy, 36(7): 1016-1034. 
Ornaghi, C. 2006. Mergers and Innovation: The Case of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton. Discussion Essays in 
Economics and Econometrics 0605.  
Orozco, D. 2007. Will India and China profit from technological innovation? 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 5(3): 426-435.  
Pautler, P. 2001. Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions. Bureau of Economics, 
Federal Trade Commission: WP. 
Perez, C. and Soete, L. 1988. Catching up in technology: entry barriers and windows 
of  opportunities. Technical Change and Economic Theory, 458-479. 
Pieper, R. 1990. Human Resource Management: An International Comparison. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.  
Pillai, P.M. 1979. Technology  transfer, adaptation  and assimilation. Economic and 
Political Weekly, 14(47): 121-126. 
  162 
Pitkethly, R.H. 2001. Intellectual property strategy in Japanese and UK companies: 
patent licensing decisions and learning opportunities. Research Policy, 30(3): 425-
442. 
Phene, A., Fladmoe-Lindquist, F. and Marsh, L. 2006. Breakthrough innovations in 
the U.S. biotechnology industry: The effects of technological space and geographic 
origin. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 369-388. 
Prahalad, C.K. 2004. The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating 
Poverty with Profits. Philadelphia: Wharton Business Publishing. 
Prahalad, C.K. 2012. Bottom of the pyramid as a source of breakthrough innovations. 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 29(1): 6-12. 
Rafii, F. and Kampas, P. 2002. How to identify your enemies before they destroy 
you. Harvard Business Review, 80 (11): 115-123.  
Ray, S. and Ray, P.K. 2011. Product innovation for the people‘s car in an emerging 
economy. Technovation, 31(5-6): 216-227. 
Reuters,  2012. http://www.zaobao.com.sg/cninvest/pages5/cninvest_zong120621a.shtml 
Ritter, F.E. and Schooler, L.J. 2002. The learning curve. In Smelser, N. J. and 
Baltes, P. B, (eds.) International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral 
Sciences. Amsterdam: Pergamon, 8602-8605. 
  163 
Roberts, E.B. and Berry, C.A. 1985. Entering new businesses: Selecting strategies 
for success. MIT Sloan Management Review, 26. 
Rockett, K.E. 1990a. Choosing the competition and patent licensing. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 21(1): 161-171. 
Rockett, K.E. 1990b. The quality of licensed technology. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 8(4): 559-574. 
Rosenkopf, L. and Nerkar, A. 2001. Beyond local search: boundary-spanning, 
exploration, and impact in the optical disk industry. Strategic Management Journal, 
22(4): 287-306. 
Rostand, A. 1994. Optimizing Managerial Decisions during the Acquisition 
Integration Process. 14th Annual Strategic Management Society International 
Conference, Paris. 
Rothwell, R. 1994.  Towards the fifth-generation innovation process. International 
Marketing Review, 11(1): 7-31. 
Schoenberg, R. 2000. The influence of cultural compatibility within cross-border 
acquisitions: A review. Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, 1(1): 43-59. 
Schoenberg, R. 2006. Measuring the performance of corporate acquisitions: An 
empirical comparison of alternative metrics. British Journal of Management, 17(4): 
361-370. 
  164 
Schoenecker, T. and Swanson, L. 2002. Indicators of firm technological capability: 
Validity and performance implications. Engineering Management, 49(1): 36-44. 
Schweiger, D. and Very, P. 2003. Creating value through merger and acquisition 
integration. Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2: 1-26.  
Sen, F. and Rubenstein, A.H. 1990. An exploration of factors affecting the 
integration of in-house R&D with external technological acquisition strategies of a 
firm. IEEE Transaction on Engineering Management, 37(4): 246-258. 
Seth, A. 1990. Value creation in acquisitions: A re-examination of performance 
issues. Strategic Management Journal, 11(2): 99-115. 
Sevilir, M. and Tian, X. 2012. Acquiring Innovation. Working Paper, Indiana 
University. 
Shane, S. 2001. Regimes and new firm formation. Management Science, 47(9): 
1173-1190. 
Shenkar, O. and Li, J.T. 1999. Knowledge search in international cooperative 
ventures. Organization Science, 10(2): 134-143.  
Shleifer,  A.  and   Vishny, R.  1991. Takeovers in the 80s and the 90s: Evidence and 
implication.  Strategic Management Journal, 12: 51-59. 
  165 
Singh, H. and Zollo, M. 1997. Knowledge Accumulation and the Evolution of 
Post-acquisition Management Practices. Presented at the Academy Management 
Conference, Boston, August 8-13. 
Song, M., Bij, H.V.D. and Weggeman, M. 2005. Determinants of level of 
knowledge application: A knowledge-based and information-processing perspective. 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 22(5): 430-444. 
Sorensen, J. and Stuart, T. 2000. Aging, obsolescence and organizational innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(1): 81-112. 
Spedale, S. 2003. Technological discontinuities: Is co-operation an option? Long 
Range Planning, 36(3): 253-268. 
Spender, J. 1989. Industry Recipe: The Nature and Sources of Managerial 
Judgement. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Stock, G.N., Greis, N.P. and Fischer, W.A. 2001: Absorptive capacity and new 
product development. The Journal of High Technology Management Research, 12 
(1), 77-91. 
Tanaka, H., Iwaisako, T. and Futagami, K. 2007. Dynamic analysis of innovation 
and international transfer of technology through licensing. Journal of International 
Economics, 73: 189-212. 
  166 
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic 
management.  Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509-533. 
Teece, D.J. 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for 
integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy, 15(6): 285-
305. 
Teece, D.J. 2000. Firm Capabilities and economic development: Implications for 
newly industrializing economies. In Kim, L. and Nelson, R. (eds.), Technology, 
Learning and Innovation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 105-128. 
Tidd, J., Bessant, J. and Pavitt, K. 2001. Managing Innovation: Integrating 
Technological, Market and Organizational Change, second Edition. Chichester: 
John Wiley. 
Tsai, K.H. and Wang, J.C. 2009. External technology sourcing and innovation 
performance in LMT sectors: An analysis based on the Taiwanese technological 
innovation survey. Research Policy, 38(5): 518-526. 
Tsai, W.P. 2001. Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of 
network position and absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 44(5): 995-1004. 
  167 
Tzeng, C.H. 2008. Developing high-technology latecomer firms to compete 
internationally: A three-sector growth model. Journal of International 
Management, 14:190-206. 
Utterback, J.M. and Acee, H.J. 2005. Disruptive technologies: An expanded view. 
International Journal of Innovation Management, 9(1): 1-17. 
Vanhaverbeke, W., Beerkens, B. and Duysters, G. 2004. Explorative and 
Exploitative Learning Strategies in Technology-based Alliance Networks. 
Academy of Management Best Conference Essay, vol. TIM: J1-J6.  
Van de Vrande, V., de Jong, J.P.J. Vanhaverbeke, W. and de Rochemont, M. 2009a. 
Open innovation in SMEs: Trends, motives and management challenges. 
Technovation, 29: 423-437. 
Van de Vrande, V., Vanhaverbeke, W. and Duysters, G. 2009b. External technology 
sourcing: The effect of uncertainty on governance mode choice. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 24(1): 62-80. 
Villalonga,  B.  2004.   Does  diversification  cause  the  ‗diversification  discount‘? 
Financial Management, 33(2): 5-27. 
von Hippel, E. 1988. The Sources of Innovation. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
  168 
Wagner, R.P. 2003. Information wants to be free: Intellectual property and the 
mythologies of control. Columbia Law Review, 103: 995-1034. 
Wang, Y., Roijakkers, N. and Vanhaverbeke, W. 2013. Learning-by-licensing: 
How Chinese firms benefit from licensing-in technologies. IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management, 60(1): 46-58.  
Watanabe C. and Asgari, B. 2004. Impacts of functionality development on 
the dynamism between learning and diffusion of technology. Technovation, 24(8): 
651-664. 
Watanabe, C., Zhu, B., Criffy-Brown, C. and Asgari, B. 2001. Global technology 
spillover and its impact on industry‘s R&D strategies. Technovation,  21(5): 281-
291.  
Weick, K.E. 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd edition. MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
WIPO, 2011. http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ 
Winiecki, J. 1987. Soviet-type economies‘ strategy for catching up through 
technology imports- an anatomy of failure.  Technovation, 6(2): 115-145.   
Willmore, L. 1991. Technological imports and technological efforts: An analysis of 
the determinants in Brazilian firms. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 39(4): 
421-432. 
  169 
World Bank, 2007.  http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=licensing&language=EN 
Wu, X.B., Ma, R.F. and Shi, Y.J. 2010. How do latecomer firms capture value from 
disruptive technologies? A secondary business-model innovation perspective. IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management, 57(1): 51-61. 
Xie, W. and Wu, G.S. 2003. Differences between learning processes in small tigers 
and large dragons: Learning processes of two color TV (CTV) firms within China. 
Research Policy, 32(8): 1463-1479. 
Yu, D. and Hang, C.C. 2010. A reflective review of disruptive innovation theory. 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 12(4): 435-452. 
Yu, D. and Hang, C.C. 2011. Creating technology candidates for disruptive 
innovation: Generally applicable R&D strategies. Technovation, 31(8): 401-410. 
Zahra, S.A. and George, G. 2002. Absorptive capacity: A review, 
reconceptualization and extension. Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 185-
203. 




  170 
                                       
                                        PUBLICATIONS 
 
(Relevant to the contents in the thesis) 
 
1. Zhao, Y.Y., Wong, P.K., Subramanian, A. and Hang, C.C. 2011. New insight 
into technology licensing strategy and innovation performance: The evidence on 
Chinese latecomers in high-tech industries. The IEEE international conference on 
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, Dec. 2011, Singapore. (The 
journal version is under preparation for submission to Technovation.) 
2. Zhao, Y.Y., Wong, P.K. and Hang, C.C. 2012. Mergers and acquisitions for 
latecomers in emerging economies: The substitution effect on innovation 
performance. Strategic Management Society conference, Dec. 2012, China. (The 
journal version is under preparation for submission to Strategic Management 
Journal.) 
3. Zhao, Y.Y., Hang, C.C., Vanhaverbeke, W. and Subramanian, A. 2012. 
Combining disruptive innovation and open innovation: Evidence based on case 
studies of Chinese latecomers. Portland International Center for Management of 
Engineering and Technology conference, Jul. 2012, Vancouver. (The journal version 
has been submitted to Technological Forecasting and Social Change Journal and the 
current status is R&R.) 
 
